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ABSTRACT

Many programs aimed at airborne mine and minefield detection are being pursued
and different algorithms are being developed and evaluated to achieve performance
specifications. Thus far, no single algorithm or detection architecture has been able to
fulfill the performance specifications for different mine and minefield detection
scenarios. The reasons for this are numerous. The environment and the operating
conditions under which an airborne sensor is expected to perform are highly varied. Also,
the performance of airborne sensors and algorithms is highly dependent on the type of
targets and environments. Research has been aimed to make the algorithms more robust
under these varying conditions, but the studies have been only partially successful. A
large amount of data needs to be collected and analyzed to gain insight into detection
algorithms and their performance under different operating conditions. Data collection on
this scale is time consuming, and costly. Due to this reason, a need exist for a simulationbased approach. One such simulation system is developed and evaluated in this thesis.
The factors affecting the performance of an airborne detection system include physical
parameters (type of background, time of day), data collection parameters (swath width,
number of steps, in-step and in-flight overlap), and minefield scenarios. Data collection
parameters are included in the simulation tool. False alarms and mine statistics are
modeled based on the available data collected as a part of the developmental programs.
Various mine and minefield detection algorithms are modeled and evaluated. Simulations
are run, and Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are used to evaluate the
performance at both the mine and minefield levels. Analytical models for minefield
detection performance are formulated and used to validate the simulated performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Solutions to landmine and minefield detections have been sought for more than 75
years. A number of different sensors, algorithms and technologies have been proposed
and are now being pursued for landmine detection. All mine detection technologies can
be classified into two major categories: ground-based mine detection and airborne
minefield detection. Ground-based technologies consist of handheld and vehicular mine
detection in which either a human or a vehicle carrying a mine detection device scans the
neighborhood for mines. However, these techniques suffer with a number of obvious
drawbacks. First of all, due to the presence of humans; the risk of fatal errors always
exists. It is estimated that for every 2000 mines cleared, a fatal human error occurs
[Ghaffari et al., 2004]. Second, ground-based methods are slow because one person
clearing mines by hand can clear up to 20 to 50 square meters per day, and a vehicle can
cover about 15,000 square meters per day, which is often considered to be very slow
[Dincerler, 1995]. Third, mines are available in different materials as well as, different
sizes and shapes. This imposes limitations in the equipment and technologies used for the
landmine detection.
Because of the fatal errors, slow clearing of mines of ground based minefield
detection system, and for tactical reasons in counter mine operations, airborne
mine/minefield detection using unmanned airborne vehicles (UAV) have gained
popularity in recent years. Some of the recent airborne minefield detection programs in
this research area include the Airborne Far IR Minefield Imaging System (AFIRMIS)
[Simrad and Mathieu, 1998], Remote Minefield Detection System (REMIDS) [1999],
Cobra Reconnaissance and Analysis System (COBRA) [Witherspoon et al., 1995], and
Lightweight Airborne Multi-spectral Minefield Detection System [LAMD] [Haskett and
Reago, 2001]. Visual, near-infrared, and mid-wave infrared images of a minefield taken
from an airborne platform are processed at a ground station to determine the likely
presence of minefields and other obstacles. The data are collected using a sensor mounted
on a gimbal in either a push broom or step stair manner. The detection process typically
follows a sequential paradigm based on the detection of mine-like anomalies followed by
the detection of minefield-like patterns.
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A huge amount of data is being collected and analyzed to gain insight into the
actual mine and minefield detection algorithms and their performance. Various anomaly
detections algorithms such as RX [Reed and Yu, 1990], radial anomaly detector [Menon
and Agarwal, 2003], cluster based anomaly detection [Carlotto, 2005], signal subspace
processing [Ranney, 2006], support vector data description [Banerjee et al., 2006], and
false alarm reduction methods such as, gray-scale moments [Sriram et al., 2002],
circularity [Menon et al., 2004], and reflection symmetry [Menon et al., 2004; Kiryati and
Gofman, 1996] have been used to identify mine like targets. Various minefield detection
algorithms have been similarly proposed such as the empty boxes test algorithm [Lake et
al., 1997], linear pattern detection [Malloy, 2003; Muise and Smith, 1995], Hough line
transforms [Carlson et al., 1994], Scatter Number [Earp, 2000b] and Scatter Log
weighted [Earp et al., 1995].
Apart from the algorithm choices, the performance of the system depends on
various other factors, including minefield scenarios (such as scattered or patterned), and
data collection parameters such as swath width, side step overlap, and the size of the field
of regard (FoR). Mine and minefield detection algorithms need to be evaluated for
different backgrounds like arid and temperate. To evaluate the performance of the sensors
and detection algorithms for different scenarios and algorithm choices, an enormous
amount of data collection is required. This collection and subsequent analysis of data is
one of the most expensive aspects in the process of system development and evaluation.
Moreover, it is impossible to collect the data for all possible variations in mine and
minefield detection scenarios and other data collection parameters. However, it is quite
possible to generate reasonably accurate simulation data under different sensors,
minefield layout scenarios, and mission-specific constraints. The simulated data can
subsequently be used to evaluate the performance of different choices of algorithms and
data collection models under different scenarios. This thesis describes the design of a
simulation tool to evaluate mine and minefield level performances based on simulated
data under different sensors and mission profile parameters. Mine and minefield level
performances obtained using simulated data are verified using analytical results and
available data.
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This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with the basic airborne
minefield detection system and explains its various blocks with the help of actual data.
Section 3 explains the simulation system, which is developed to simulate the minefield
detection system and also describe the flexibility incorporated in the simulated systems.
This system evaluates the performance for a particular choice of data collection
parameters, minefield scenarios, and mine and minefield detection and thresholding
algorithm.
Section 4 presents a detailed explanation of the RX anomaly detector. The RX
detection values are then modeled using standard probabilistic models. The modeling
results for different times of day and, different background types are provided. The
performance of these models for different datasets is tested using the chi square test.
Section 5 deals with spatial distributions that are used to model the spatial
locations of the false alarms. Complete spatial random processes, their tests and
generation methods are discussed in some detail. Preliminary results for spatial
distribution of mines and false alarms are also presented.
Section 6 deals with analytical models for different minefields detection methods.
It also explains the choice of minefield detection algorithms used for detecting the
presence of a minefield. Minefield scoring techniques are also explained in this section.
Section 7 shows simulation results for a particular set of parameters. Simulation results
are generated showing the effect of various parameters including swath width, signal to
clutter ratio, constant false alarm rate, and segment overlap. This thesis concludes with
Section 8, which discusses the general conclusions and future work in this area.
Some of the supporting concepts and derivations are included in four Appendices.
Appendix A lists various spectral vegetation indices. It also shows the capability of these
indices to differentiate between vegetation and non-vegetation (rock, soil, etc.). Appendix
B discusses the EM algorithm and its mathematical formulation. It also derives the
formulation of the update equation and finally parameter estimation for RX statistics.
Convergence properties of the EM algorithm are also discussed. Appendix C explores the
method of moments to estimate the initial parameters for RX distribution to be used for
the EM estimation. Appendix D discusses different tests to evaluate the goodness of fit
for the probability model obtained.

4
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION

This section describes the basic airborne minefield detection system and the role
different parameters play in determining detection performance. A typical airborne
minefield detection system can be described in the form of the block diagram in Figure
2.1. It consists of three different stages, each represented by a single block. The first stage
involves data collection, which deals with various factors such as platform data, sensor
data, minefield layout, and background data. Once the data are collected, they are
processed in the mine level detection block to provide a list of anomalies, which are
different for different backgrounds and depend on the anomaly detection algorithm used
for the processing. The anomaly values are then thresholded and passed to minefield level
detection block where the thresholded anomaly values are processed along with their
spatial locations to provide a confidence metric pertaining to the presence of a minefield.
Minefield level scoring is used to evaluate the performance of the airborne minefield
system in terms of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves.

Sensor Minefield
Data Layout
Bkg Data

Platform
Data

Data Collection
Scenarios

AD
Mine Level
Algorithm Thresholding

Mine Level
Detection

MF
Minefield Level
Algorithm Scoring

Minefield Level
Detection

Figure 2.1. Block Diagram for a Typical Airborne Minefield Detection System

Different data collection scenarios, as well as mine detection and minefield
detection algorithms, are the main drivers of the performance of this airborne minefield
detection system. Each of these blocks is discussed briefly in the following section and
elaborated further in later sections.
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2.1. DATA COLLECTION SCENARIOS
The airborne data are collected in the form of a sequence of image frames
captured as the sensor is flown over the minefield. In a typical system, the airborne
sensor is flown over the minefield area at a predefined altitude and speed, with a gimbal
to collect frames of images in a specified pattern. The image data collected from one
flight are called a run. A specified number of frames create a segment/field of regard
(FoR), and a set of segments constitutes a run. The geo-locations of each frame along
with other information constitute Meta data (data of data) collected using onboard GPS
and IMU. These Meta data and any available image overlap are used to reconstruct the
ground image for the FoR. Minefield decision is based on the detection statistics
calculated over this FoR. Various factors of data collections that may affect the minefield
detection performance are discussed below.
2.1.1. Background Data. Background data play an important role in performance
evaluation. Background refers to the ground terrain in which mines are being laid. The
background may be vegetation, soil, road, or a combination of two or more of these areas.
Vegetation can be either thick forest or tall grass, and soil can be either rough clay or
smooth desert terrain among others. Apart from natural background there may be
cultured sources of clutter in the background like soft drink cans among others. In order
to capture the impact of these on the detection performance, both natural and cultured
sources of clutter should be modeled appropriately.
2.1.2. Minefield Layout. Mines are distributed in a predefined pattern that
includes both patterned and scattered distribution. Each minefield will exhibit different
performance due to different types of mines (metal, plastic, etc.), different sizes of mines,
and different types of spatial distributions of mines. These layouts of the minefields are
dictated primarily by the mechanism by which mines are laid in the minefield and tactical
scenarios. The mines can be laid manually, by ground vehicle, or by helicopter. The
mines can be surface laid or buried and can be of different sizes varying from small to
large. Mines can also be classified based on the composition, i.e., they can be made up of
either metal or plastic. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of mines. Figure 2.2(a) shows
typical distribution of mines for the case of scattered and Figure 2.2(b) shows typical
distribution of mines for patterned minefields. Detection of mines depends greatly on the
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type of mine (plastic or metal), size (large, medium or small), and color of mines (tan,
green). Apart from these factors, number of other factors such as background terrain, time
of day also influences the performance.

(a) Scattered Minefield

(b) Patterned Minefield

Figure 2.2. Typical Distribution of Mines in Scattered and Patterned Minefield

2.1.3. Platform Data. Platform data comprises a number of parameters such as
the altitude at which the UAV is flying, flight speed, flight angle, and start position of the
UAV. The flight altitude decides the ground sample distance (GSD) along with other
parameters for the images, whereas the flight speed determines the frame rate for the
image data to be collected and the in-flight overlap between the frames. In the real
environment, these platform parameters are not constant and change across the frames
and segments due to various reasons. Various distributions can be used to model these
parameters. The variability of the start position and the start angle relate to how the run
encounters the minefield front.
The flight speed and a number of other factors including the wind angle, roll,
yaw, and pitch of the vehicle are also not constant throughout the whole run. Even the
altitude of the flight changes over the run due to changes in the terrain relief, which
eventually change the image resolution for a particular frame. Sensor parameters such as
side-step overlap also vary due to wobbling in the platform and gimbal pointing error.
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Figure 2.3 shows variations in the flight altitude, flight speed, and heading angle for four
consecutive segments (84 frames) corresponding to the same run of the airborne data.
Table 2.1 shows various parameters and corresponding statistics for a particular run.

Figure 2.3. Variation in Flight Altitude, Speed, and Heading Angle for Four Segments
from Airborne Data

2.1.4. Sensor Data. Sensor data deal with the parameters of the sensor used for
the collection of data. For current purposes, the sensors are basically imaging sensors that
operate over various frequency bands of the EM spectrum. Many sensors operate in the
mid-wave infra red (MWIR) frequency range because this frequency band is sensitive to
the thermal contrast as well as reflectance and has desirable spatial resolution. Significant
thermal contrast can be found between metallic and non-metallic mines and typical
backgrounds for surface as well as buried mines, making the imaging more convenient
than other modalities. The MWIR provides useful data during both day time and night
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time imaging. Multi spectral imaging (MSI) sensors in visual and near infrared are also
used for the image capture. These sensors facilitate the dual purpose of creating a colored
image from the individual bands as well as showing features in visual and near infrared
bands that may not be prominent in any one of the single band.

Table 2.1. Various Parameters and Segment Information for a Particular Run
8-May-05
Date
14.51.12 Afternoon Time Data
Time
57
No. of IR segments
57
No. of MSI segments
Mean
Standard Deviation Units
2073.00
149.59
feet
Altitude
72.77
3.29
knots
Flight Speed
59.95
9.40
meters
Segment Width
172.48
10.74
meters
Segment Length

Figure 2.4 shows an example of the tiled image for the daytime MWIR image
segment. Figure 2.5 shows a single frame for red, green, blue, and NIR bands of the MSI
sensor. The MSI sensor, however, is unavailable at night time due to the lack of
illumination. Figure 2.6 shows the tiled image for the night time MWIR image segment.
For the comparison sake, the area covered in night time and day time IR segment is the
same. Because MWIR data shows a mix of reflection and thermal signature in contrast to
MSI data, which is primary based on reflected data, it is useful even in the night time.
2.1.5. Reconstruction/Registration. The individual overlapping image frames
for the FoR obtained using the gimbal needs to be stitched together to create mosaic
image of the FoR. This method is called registration. Figures 2.7 and 2.8 show an
example for the daytime MWIR and MSI image segments, respectively, for the same
segment whose tiled image is shown in Figure 2.4. The colored image in Figure 2.7 and
elsewhere are generated using the red, green, and blue bands. Figure 2.9 shows the
corresponding night time data for MWIR. One of the same terrain features is indicated by
a red circle in all three images for easy comparison.
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Figure 2.4. Tiled Image Segment for MWIR Data

(a) Frame for a Red Band

(c) Frame for a Blue Band

(b) Frame for a Green Band

(d) Frame for a NIR Band

Figure 2.5. Red, Green, Blue, and NIR Frames for an MSI Image Segment
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Figure 2.6. Tiled Image Segment for Night Time MWIR Data

Figure 2.7. Afternoon Time MSI Registered Image Segment

The registration is possible due to the availability of Meta data as well as in-step
and in-flight overlap between image frames. Due to the computation complexity of image
based registration, it is desirable if part of processing can be done with registration based
only on the geolocation in Metadata. However, the registration/reconstruction error will
be worse in those cases when the overlap between image frames is not enough or cannot
be used due to computational costs. The resulting larger registration error has bearing on
minefield performance especially for patterned minefields since the detected mines may
loose their linearity.
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Figure 2.8. Afternoon Time MWIR Registered Image Segment

Figure 2.9. Night Time Segment for MWIR Data

Mine level detection of the mine like targets, can either be performed at the frame
level or at segment level. However, some prejudice might be associated at the frame level
calculation due to duplication of the false alarms in adjacent (both in-step and in-swath)
frames resulting in biased performance because contribution from one false alarm may be
recorded multiple times. Because of this reason, good registration is important in order to
accurately transform these individual frames in a single coordinate system. Thus
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reconstruction is also the method by which the anomaly detections of individual frames
are resolved to identify unique detections in FoR.

2.2. MINE DETECTION
The purpose of mine detection block is to detect the location of potential mines
once the anomaly values are assigned to each pixel. Mine detection step is intermediate
step before the minefield detection that provides the information about the detection of
mine like targets along with certain inevitable false alarms. Mine detection depends on a
slew of factors including the type of sensor(s), target signature (signal to clutter ratio),
size of the target, resolution of the sensor, type of the background, and the algorithm
(anomaly detection, false alarm mitigation methods) used.
In the proposed simulation system, only a set of potential mine locations and
potential false alarm locations are simulated. Thus it is important to assign an appropriate
anomaly detection statistics to the mine and false alarm points. Different models for the
distribution of anomaly detection statistics can be used which depend on the detection
algorithm. One of the popular algorithms used for anomaly detection is RX [Reed and
Yu, 1990]. The corresponding detection statistics under the white Gaussian background
follow the central F-distribution. However, the distribution of RX detection statistics can
be quite different for a more general background due to cultured clutter and spatial
correlation in the background data that influences the system performance. One of the
major reasons for deviation from the ideal behavior is the assumption of a white Gaussian
background, that is not always true due to the presence of different classes of terrains
[Stein et al., 2002], and the presence of multi resolution feature spaces [Noiboar and
Cohen, 2007]. A number of other distributions for anomaly detectors are proposed based
on different features which are discussed in Section 4.5.
The performance of the sensor at the mine level detection is parameterized in
terms of the probability of detection (PD) and corresponding false alarm rate (FAR)
(false alarms per m2). A mine level ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve is
drawn showing the mine level performance in terms of PD and FAR. The issue in this
case of mine detection performance modeling is to develop a model for the selected mine
detection algorithm to assign proper test statistics to mine and false alarm detections and
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estimate mine level performance (in terms of PD and FAR) for a given sensor, target, and
background under reasonable assumptions.

2.3. THRESHOLDING AND TARGET SELECTION
The anomaly detection algorithm assigns a confidence value or some other metric
to a point being a likely mine. The next step is to threshold the list of these locations to
obtain the set of valid anomalies that are statistically distinct from the neighboring
background and highly prospective mines. These sets of anomalies are then passed for the
minefield level processing. Another reason for the performing thresholding operation is
to effectively reduce the number of targets that will be passed for the minefield detection.
Thresholding algorithms used for the selection of targets affect the minefield detection
performance. Three different thresholding schemes are discussed in section 3.3. False
alarm mitigation (FAM) techniques can also be applied before passing the thresholded
targets for the minefield level processing. FAM techniques try to reduce false alarms by
exploiting the shape, photometric, polarity, spectral and other properties of the mine
targets to reject likely false alarms. Detailed FAM techniques are discussed in [Menon
2005]. However for present implementation, these techniques are not modeled.

2.4. MINEFIELD DETECTION
Locations of targets obtained after target selection and thresholding are then used
to detect the presence of the minefield and eventually evaluate the minefield confidence
metric for the given FoR. The minefield detection performance depends on the type of
minefield, characteristics of the background, mine level performance and the minefield
algorithm. In a typical implementation separate algorithms are used for patterned and
scattered minefields. Numerous algorithms are available in the literature for these two
types of minefields. The empty boxes test (EBT) algorithm [Lake et al., 1997], linear
pattern detection [Malloy, 2003; Muise and Smith, 1995], robust mine detection
algorithm [Robins and Robinson, 1995], and Hough line transforms [Carlson et al., 1994]
are some of the patterned minefield detection algorithms available in the literature.
Scatter Number [Earp, 2000b] and Scatter Log weighted [Earp et al., 1995] are some of
the techniques used for scattered minefield detection.
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The performance of the system at the minefield detection level is defined in terms
of the minefield probability of detection and the corresponding false alarm rate (false
alarms per km2). The system specifications are often defined in terms of the operating
point on this curve. Another factor that may impact the evaluation of minefield
performance is the minefield scoring method used. Two possible scoring methods are
also discussed in Section 3.4.
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3. SIMULATION SYSTEM

This section presents an overview of the simulation system which is being used to
simulate and evaluate the performance of a typical airborne minefield detection system.
A graphical user interface called "SimulAMFD" is developed to facilitate this evaluation
[Agarwal and Agarwal, 2006]. The GUI provides an input interface between the user and
the modeling software and allows the user to specify different design parameters,
evaluate mine and minefield level performance, and analyze individual mine and
minefield detection algorithms. This simulation system estimates airborne mine and
minefield performance under different sensor and minefield layout scenarios. The
methodologies and models used for data collection, mine detection, and minefield
detection are discussed below separately. The simulation system allows estimating mine
and minefield level performance for a particular choice of data collection parameters and
algorithms. It is also possible to compare analytical and simulation-based results for
selected detection scenarios for validation purposes. The simulation system also has the
flexibility to conduct design trade-off by comparing performance between different
choices of sensor-related parameters.

3.1. DATA SIMULATION
Data collection is the first step for any minefield detection system. The data for
the simulation are generated in a manner that closely resembles the data collection in
various airborne minefield detection programs. A large number of parameters are
involved in the simulation of data for an airborne minefield detection system. Most of
these parameters are used to model the flight path over the simulated background and
minefield scenario. Table 3.1 gives a list of the parameters needed for modeling and
analysis of data collection scenarios. The parameters shown in Table 3.1 are directly
provided to the simulation system. A number of other parameters are also used, which are
derived using these parameters. The input and derived parameters are discussed in the
following subsections in more detail.
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Table 3.1. Data Collection Parameters for Simulation

Platform Data

DATA COLLECTION PARAMETERS
Background
Sensor and Gimbal Data
Data

Minefield
Data
Minefield
Layout

Nominal Flight
Speed (V)

Camera Resolution (NxM)

Length

Variation in
Flight Speed

Camera Orientation

Breadth

Minefield
Distribution

Nominal Flight
Altitude (A)

FOV (FOVx , FOVy)

Background
Anomaly Density

Minefield
Position

Variation in
Flight Altitude

Frame rate (H)

Spatial
Distribution

Mine Size
and Material

Flight Angle

Number of Steps per FoR (s)

Anomaly
Statistics

Mine
Statistics

Flight Position

Side step Overlap (λy)
Number of Swath per FoR (S)

3.1.1. Platform Data. The flight speed (knots) and corresponding variation are
provided directly in the simulation tool. Similarly, the flight altitude (feet) and its
corresponding variation are also predefined. The flight angle in degrees is the heading
angle of the flight with respect to the X axis on the ground. The flight angle can be a
fixed number or may have some variation. The variations in flight speed, flight altitude,
and flight angle can be modeled using Uniform or Gaussian distribution. For this,
appropriate inputs (minimum and maximum values for Uniform distribution and mean,
standard deviation values for Gaussian distribution) are provided to the simulation
system. The flight position is the position where the flight path for a given run will start.
Similar to the flight angle, the position can be a fixed X and Y locations or it can be
distributed according to Uniform distribution for which the start and end positions for
both the X and Y directions will be provided.
3.1.2. Sensor and Gimbal Data. The field of view, number of rows and columns,
and altitude define the GSD, which in turn defines the target size. Camera Orientation
defines the orientation for the data collection. It can be either 0 degree, which is the
default orientation for step–stare data collection (in which the columns of an image frame
are in the in-flight direction and the rows of an image frame are in the across- flight
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direction), or 90 degrees, which is the default orientation for push broom data collection.
The number of rows and columns define the size of an image frame. If the image size is
given by NxM in pixels and FOVx and FOV y are the field of view in 'x' and 'y'
direction, then resolution/ground sample distance (GSD) of the sensor (in inches), r is
given as

r=

π * A * FOVx
15M

=

π * A * FOVy
15 N

(inch)

(3.1)

where altitude A is in feet and FOVx and FOV y are in degrees.
Now, the length (X) and width (Y) of the image (in meters) for the step-stare mode
is given by
X = 0.0254rM , Y = 0.0254 rN

(3.2)

and for the push broom mode is given by

X = 0.0254rN , Y = 0.0254rM

(3.3)

The frame rate is defined as the number of image frames per second and it is
provided in Hz. The number of steps depends on the mode of the data collection. For the
push broom mode, the number of steps is equal to one, whereas for the step stare mode,
the number of steps is greater then one and is derived based on the requirements of swath
width. Side step overlap λy can be controlled by the gimbal, and it is taken as an
independent variable. A positive value of λy represents the corresponding fraction of
overlap between images in the direction perpendicular to the flight, and a negative value
represents a holiday (or a gap) between frames. The number of steps and side step
overlap along with other parameters define the swath width which determines the width
of the minefield encountered in the run and has bearing on the minefield detection. The
swath per FoR is predefined number that dictates the length of the FoR.

18
In-flight overlap depends on the frame rate of the sensor, the flight speed, and the
frame length. The in-flight overlap λ x is given by

λ x = 1−

Vs
1.94384 XH

(3.4)

where V is the flight speed in knots, s is the number of steps per swath, and H is the
frame rate of the sensor in Hz. The swath width W and length L of an FoR is then
calculated as

W = (1 − λ y ) sY + λ yY , L = (1 − λ x ) SX + λ x X

(3.5)

where S is the number of swaths per FoR.
3.1.3. Background Data. Background data such as length, breadth (meters), and

anomaly density (per meter square) are directly provided to the simulation system.
Length and breadth define the size of the simulated background area. A set of parameters
is needed to be provided to define distribution of anomaly statistics. Different anomaly
detection (AD) algorithms can be used to generate AD values for the simulation. The
anomaly statistics are dictated by the AD algorithms. AD algorithms calculate the test
statistics at all the pixel locations on the image to find those pixels which are statistically
different from the background. This test statistics depends on number of factors such as
background type, AD algorithm used, time of the day, etc. This test statistics can then be
modeled using various statistical distributions. RX is one of the most popular AD
algorithms, whose test statistics can be modeled by Beta distribution or Gamma
distribution as explained in [Ganju, 2006]. Another distribution that can be used to model
the RX anomaly values is central F distribution which is used in this thesis and discussed
in Section 4.3. Distributions, other than these can also be used to model the test statistics.
Thus, for modeling the anomaly values, input parameters corresponding to a particular
distribution are provided as inputs to the simulation system. The parameters can be
degrees of freedom (numerator, denominator) for a central F distribution, shape
parameters for a two-parameter Beta distribution, and a shape parameter and scale
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parameter for a two-parameter Gamma distribution. Spatial distribution deals with
statistical models that can be used to model the spatial locations of these anomaly values.
Similar to anomaly statistics, spatial distribution requires inputs for some mathematical
(or statistical) models used to model the spatial locations of the background anomaly
values. Poisson distribution is currently implemented to model the spatial distribution of
background anomaly.
3.1.4. Minefield Data. In the present tool, nine from many possible minefield

templates used in minefield deployment [FM 20-32, 1998] have been implemented.
Among these, scattered and patterned minefields are the two most commonly used
templates. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show representative spatial distributions of the two
minefield templates, respectively. For patterned minefield, mines are arranged in a three
rows that are not necessarily straight or linear.

Figure 3.1. Minefield Template Used for Generating a Scattered Minefield

Figure 3.2. Minefield Template Used for Generating a Patterned Minefield
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The minefield position provides information about the locations where a
minefield is placed in the simulated background. Mine statistics describe various
statistical models that are used to model the anomaly detection statistics at the locations
of mines. Similar to the false alarm statistics, a set of parameters is needed to be provided
for the distribution of mine statistics. One such model is discussed in section 4.1.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 represent simulated runs. Figure 3.3 shows a simulated run in
which the segment passes over the minefield completely and thus constitutes a minefield
segment, whereas in Figure 3.4 the run completely misses the minefield. The flight angle
is assumed to be uniformly distributed with the minimum and maximum flight angle

( ±Δθ ) specified as ±100. The altitude and flight speed is assumed to be constant and kept
at 2050 ft and 75 knots, respectively. The flight position is also assumed to be uniformly
distributed along the 'x' direction (minefield depth) and kept constant along the 'y'
direction (minefield front). The background point locations are simulated as Poisson
distribution with a specified density. A part of these background points constitute the
mine level false alarm for the background. In the current simulation, a density of 0.01
background points per meter square is used because in most cases the highest false alarm
rate considered at the mine level is 0.01 FA/m2. The minefield layout of a patterned or
scattered minefield is designed according to specified templates. In all simulations, the
flight path is taken to be approximately perpendicular to the minefield front. However, a
variation of approximately 150 is allowed. Green dots (.) represent the background
clutter, and red diamonds represent the mines. Represented segments and frames are also
highlighted along with the flight start position and flight angle.

3.2. EVALUATING MINE LEVEL PERFORMANCE

Once the data are generated corresponding to the provided parameters, the next
step is to evaluate the mine level performance. Mine level performance depends on the
AD algorithm (such as RX etc.) which is captured by the Figure 2.1. The anomaly values
obtained from the AD algorithm are thresholded and for each threshold, the probability of
detection (PD) of a mine and corresponding false alarm rate (FAR) are calculated. The
PD and FAR depend on the distribution of the anomaly values for the false alarm and
mine targets. Mine level ROC curves are then drawn to plot the PD against the FAR.

21

a run

Flight Start
Position

Flight angle
Minefield

a segment

a frame

Figure 3.3. Simulated Run Passing Over the Minefield Completely

Figure 3.4. Simulated Run Missing the Minefield Completely
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3.3. THRESHOLDING SCHEMES

The anomaly detection values are thresholded to obtain the set of most likely
anomalies which are statistically distinct from the neighboring background. The threshold
plays a significant role because the targets selected at this level participate in the
minefield level detection. The selected targets should be such that a reasonable number of
false alarms are passed while selecting certain levels of mines for effective minefield
detection. A number of thresholding schemes for this purpose can be used. Each
thresholding scheme affects the probability of minefield detection and corresponding
false alarm rate in a different manner. Three different thresholding methods are discussed
in this section.
3.3.1. Fixed Threshold. This is a straightforward scoring approach in which only

the targets with detection statistics above the specified threshold are allowed to take part
in scoring. The threshold is provided by the user in the modeling tool. This scoring
approach provides reasonable performance for the cases where the non-maximal
suppressed anomaly values follow almost the same statistical distribution for all FoRs.
Thus, this scoring scheme can yield very good minefield detection performance if the
background is homogeneous. It is, however, often impossible a priori to select an
appropriate value of threshold because a desired value of the threshold may differ from
terrain to terrain due to differences in the background data. The threshold will also
depend on the time of day due to shadows and other effects. Moreover, due to the
difference in background features from one FoR to another, the number of detections may
be very large in some FoR and very small in other FoR.
3.3.2. Constant Target Rate. The constant target rate (CTR) implies that in each

FoR, a fixed number of target locations with the highest detection statistics are selected.
Number of targets is provided as an input in the modeling tool. Effectively the detection
threshold changes from one FoR to another FoR in this case, depending on the selected
target rate per FoR. The minefield level performance becomes subjective for this
thresholding scenario because the number of false alarms selected per FoR remains same
irrespective of the type of terrain. The minefield detection in this case should rely on a
metric different then the number of detections. The detection of mines for this
thresholding scheme may result in poor performance in a non-homogeneous background
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because the probability of selecting some fixed number of mine targets in a highly
cluttered area will be less than the probability of detecting the same number of mine
targets in a low cluttered area. Moreover, if the number of targets is not selected
appropriately, then it may result in poor minefield performance as well. Thus, this
scheme can be used effectively for homogeneous background, but not for nonhomogeneous background due to the above stated reasons.
3.3.3. Constant False Alarm Rate. In CFAR case, the detection statistics are

modeled by appropriate distribution and a threshold is selected for a desired false alarm
rate. The false alarm rate per square meter ( ρ B ) is specified. In this thresholding scheme,
the expected number of false alarms in a selected area is a constant which depends on the
type of distribution that is used to model the detection statistics and the goodness of fit of
the model. For each segment, the detection statistics are modeled by an appropriate
distribution and the threshold is selected adaptively as shown in [Ramachandran, 2004].
A particular false alarm rate can be used depending on the type of background and
terrain. If the background is highly cluttered then it can be anticipated that for a higher
detection of mine targets, the false alarm rate should be higher. In contrast, for areas with
low natural clutter, a lower false alarm rate can be used to achieve higher detection of
mine targets. Thus, CFAR is a very effective scheme for thresholding mine targets,
resulting in possibly better mine and minefield detection performance.

3.4. EVALUATING MINEFIELD LEVEL PERFORMANCE

This is the final step in a typical airborne minefield detection system. The
minefield level performance depends on the minefield detection algorithm, mine level
performance, thresholding scheme, and the minefield scoring method used. Because most
of the mines are either scattered or laid in a pattern in a minefield, most of the minefield
detection algorithms provide an indication of presence in the form of a minefield
confidence metric, which is a quantitative measure of the confidence level for the
presence or absence of a minefield in that area. The thresholded anomaly values, along
with their spatial locations, are provided as an input to these minefield detection
algorithms over which the minefield confidence metric is derived. Various algorithms
that are currently being implemented are pattern linear, pattern regular for a patterned
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minefield, and scatter number and scatter log weighted for a scattered minefield. These
algorithms are explained in detail in Section 7.
Once the minefield level confidence values are obtained the next and final step is
to score the minefield for its performance evaluation in terms of an ROC curve. This
ROC curve will then represents the probability of detection against the probability of
false alarm for a minefield. The minefield confidence statistics effectively represent the
likelihood that a minefield is present in this FoR or the likelihood that the given FoR is
collected over an actual minefield. These FoRs may be non-overlapping, or a sliding
window approach is used to define an overlapping FoR. Scoring can be done either for a
segment/FoR or a complete run. Both of these scoring methods are currently
implemented in the simulation system.
In scoring the detection performance, the simplest approach is to identify FoRs
that are actually over the minefield to establish the ground truth. Once this ground truth is
established, each FoR can be scored as a detection or false alarm, and an ROC curve can
be drawn. For FoR-wise minefield scoring, one input is required in the simulation system.
If the input is between 0 and 1(inclusive), then the ratio of the area occupied by the mines
to the area of the FoR should be greater than the input to be called a minefield FoR.
However, if the number is greater than 1, then that many mines should be detected in a
FoR for it to be called a valid minefield FoR. The main problem with this approach is that
at times an FoR may only be partially over the minefield. In such cases one would have
to make an arbitrary choice of when to call a given FoR as belonging to a minefield and
when not to do so. The evaluated performance is significantly dependent on this choice.
Moreover, the resulting ROC curves give the probability of correct classification of the
FoR and not the probability of detection of the minefield.
An alternative, slightly complicated, but more representative approach is to score
the runs and not the individual FoR. In this case the scoring is based on actual geolocations of a minefield. The minefield is defined by its location and extent. Any run that
intercepts the minefield suitably is said to be a minefield run. In practice, one run can
have more than one minefield, which would be evaluated as independent minefields. A
minefield is said to be detected if any FoR that falls over the minefield is flagged as
containing a minefield. Multiple detections over the same minefield location are
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neglected. A similar approach is followed for false alarms. Any FoR that does not
intercept a minefield is a likely candidate for a false alarm. However, multiple false
alarms that hit in the same area of the field are neglected. Thus, once an FoR is called a
false alarm, any other FoR within a specified distance from this FoR will not be counted
as a false alarm. It is important to note that the length of this distance over which further
false alarms are neglected does not affect the measured false alarm rate; it only limits the
maximum false alarm rate that could be reported. Any reasonable size such as 100m or
200m can be used. However, the size should be at least as long as the length of an FoR. If
the scoring is done over the complete run, then any FoR having more than zero mine
targets can be defined as a valid minefield segment.
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4.

ANOMALY DETECTION — MODELING RX STATISTICS

AD algorithm calculates the detection statistics at all the pixel locations on the
image to find the pixels that are statistically different from the background. This section
discusses the modeling of the statistics for an Anomaly Detection (AD) algorithm. RX is
one of the most popular algorithms for anomaly detection [Reed and Yu, 1990; Holmes,
1995]. Modeling of the detection statistics for RX algorithm is discussed in this section.
Further processing such as False Alarm Mitigation (FAM) can then be used to segregate
the possible mine targets from the false alarm depending on various feature classification
algorithms such as circularity, radial symmetry, and gray scale moments [Menon et al.,
2004]. For the present discussion, the RX algorithm is used to detect the possible mine
targets from the background anomaly. False alarm mitigation has not been currently
implemented.

4.1. MODELING RX ANOMALY DETECTOR

Various anomaly detection algorithms are proposed for mine level detection in the
literature such as RX [Reed and Yu, 1990; Holmes, 1995], and Unmixing Component
Analysis [Yanfeng et al., 2006]. An optimal matched response based on a locally
estimated first-order Gauss-Markov model for the background and known mine template
has been proposed by Liao et al. for anomaly detection [Liao et al., 2001]. For the current
discussion, the anomaly detection algorithm considered is RX. The RX algorithm has
become the de-facto baseline anomaly detector. This algorithm assumes the available
images to be zero mean, uncorrelated, and Gaussian distributed. This assumption is fair
enough for most of the low-resolution electro-optical sensors (although many images are
not truly Gaussian distributed). By definition, images are not zero mean; however, real
images can often be assumed to have a slowly varying mean value. A non-stationary
local mean can be subtracted from the image to generate a locally zero mean image,
which is then passed through the RX anomaly detector. The RX detector then provides
the statistical measure for the presence of an anomaly at each pixel location in the image.
However, all pixel RX values are not used because local neighborhood values are often
correlated in case of high resolution images. Instead the local maximum in the
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neighborhood can be considered as viable anomalies. This is achieved by non-max
suppression, which can be viewed as a filter process that only allows the maximum value
in a given neighborhood to pass while suppressing all the other RX values. A detailed
explanation of the RX anomaly detector and the working of non-max suppression can be
found in [Ramachandran, 2004]. This section presents a brief overview of the RX
algorithm and outlines its functional working.
The RX algorithm involves three sets of masks: the target mask, the blanking
mask, and the demeaning mask. Figure 4.1 shows the geometry of the three masks used
in the current implementation. Square or rectangular mask can also be used. The target
radius (rT ) defines the target mask (WT), which defines the size of the target signature,
which is assumed to be circular in shape. The annular region between the target radius
and blanking radius (rB) defines the blanking mask and specifies the region that is
omitted from the estimation process. This region is excluded because it may typically
contain shadows and other reflective effects of the target. Inclusion of this region can
distort the target and clutter estimates. The third mask is the clutter mask, which is
defined as the annular region between blanking radius (rB) and demeaning radius (rD ) ,
which defines the extent of the background that is used to compute the background
covariance. This demeaning radius also defines the demeaning mask, which is used to
compute the local mean for local demeaning of the raw image.

Demeaning radius (rD)
Target Mask (WT)

Blanking radius (rB)
Target radius (rT)

Blanking Mask (WB)

Background/Clutter
Mask (WC)

Figure 4.1. Geometry of Masks in RX Anomaly Detection
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The target radius and demeaning radius are independent of each other and provide
a good estimate of the target statistics and background statistics, respectively. Effectively
this RX algorithm accepts the raw image as an input and calculates the convolution with
the set of the above three masks. Thus, what is being computed is effectively the signal to
clutter ratio for each pixel in the image. The RX output provides an image equal in size to
the size of the actual image.
The RX algorithm is generally applicable for multi-band images with zero mean
and uncorrelated Gaussian background [Reed and Yu, 1990]. For an image
pixel I (i, j ) = I l , the RX statistics r for a J band image is given by

r = μ ST M −1 μ S

(4.1)

where M is the scaled local covariance matrix and μ S is the target signature given by

M=

∑ IlT Il ,

μS =

l∈WC

1
NT

∑ Il

l∈WT

where N C = π (rD2 − rB2 ) and N T = πrT2 are the number of clutter and target pixels used in
estimating M and μ S respectively.
The scaling of RX statistics presented here is slightly different from that used in
other literature [Menon, 2005; Ganju, 2006] to ensure consistency with the origin RX
paper [Reed and Yu, 1991]. The difference arises because of the way M and μ S is
defined. The RX statistics ‘r’ used here can be written as
r = ( N T N C )rX
where rX is the RX statistics defined in [Menon, 2005; Ganju, 2006].
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Under the assumption of zero-mean uncorrelated Gaussian variable, the probability
density functions obtained by Reed and Yu [Reed and Yu, 1990] for the RX statistic for
the background location and the target location is given by,

f (r | H 0 ) =

r
f (r | H 1 ) =

r
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(4.3)

where f (r H 0 ) is the probability density function for x given that it is not a mine target
(null–hypothesis) and f (r H 1 ) is the probability density function given that the pixel
location belongs to a mine (non-null hypothesis). F1 ( x; y; z ) is the confluent
hypergeometric function, N c denotes the number of pixels in the clutter template in the
neighborhood, J represents the number of bands, and B(γ ;η ) denotes the beta density
function. The generalized signal to noise ratio (GSNR) or scale factor ' a ' is given by

a = ( SCR ) JN T

(4.4)

2

J
μ
SCR = 2 = ∑ μi2 Jσ 2
σ
i =1

(4.5)

where μ is the mean target signature, σ is the standard deviation of the background area,
and N T is the number of pixels in the target template.
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The RX statistics for background location and target location given by Equation
(4.2) and Equation (4.3) can also be modeled by the central F and non-central F
distribution. The central F distribution is defined as the ratio of two central chi squared
variates and non-central F distribution is defined as ratio between non-central chi square
and central chi square variates. Central F and non-central F distributions are defined as
[Johnson et al.,1995]:
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v1 + v2
x⎞ 2

, 0 ≤ x; v1 , v2 , a > 0 (4.7)
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v 2 ⎟⎠
⎠⎝

where v1 is the numerator degrees of freedom (and denominator degrees of freedom
(DOFN) and v2 is the denominator degrees of freedom (DOFD) and a is the GSNR.
Comparing Equations (4.2) and (4.6), the RX distribution under a null hypothesis can be
easily transformed into central F distribution with transformation

x=r

v2
v1

(4.8)

where v1 = J and v2 = N C − J and B(v1 2 , v 2 2 ) is the complete Beta function.
Thus, RX detection statistics can be modeled into an F distribution by scaling the
detection statistics by J ( N C − J ) . However, due to a non-ideal environment and with
different terrain types and local correlation in the background data, the statistics in
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Equation (4.7) often does not follow F distribution. However it is postulated that a scaled
RX statistics is defined as

x=k

v2
r
v1

(4.9)

may actually follow F distribution. This scale factor ‘k’ is very similar to the scale factor
‘ λ ’ used in [Ramachandran, 2004]. This scale factor ‘k’ also needs to be estimated. For
the present case, the scaling is derived using the statistical method as described in
Appendix C. Figure 4.2 shows some F distributions with different DOFN and DOFD .

Figure 4.2. PDF for a Central F Distribution with Different Values of DOFN and DOFD

4.2. MODELING NON-MAX SUPPRESSION

The signal to clutter image obtained from the RX algorithm is subjected to nonmax suppression to obtain the list of anomaly values which are highlighted by the
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anomaly detector. Non-maximal suppression is a processing algorithm that suppresses
(makes zero) all the targets in a specific neighborhood (R-pixel radius) except the local
maximum. The target list so obtained is effectively the list of row and column
coordinates of the potential targets along with the AD values at respective row and
column values. The operation of non-maximal suppression can be explained with the help
of Figure 4.3. Let the target location be specified by l(i,j) (marked by ‘X’ in the figure)
and let R be the radius of the local neighborhood. Only the RX values inside the radius R
will be considered for the non–maximal operation. The RX value at the central location l
is set to zero if its value is not the maximum in this R pixel neighborhood; otherwise it is
left as it is and will be a potential target. The same operation is repeated for each pixel
location in the image and all local maxima are selected.

Target with local
maximum value

Targets within the
R-pixel
neighborhood

R
l
Targets
outside the R
pixel
neighborhood

Figure 4.3. R -pixel Neighborhood Showing Potential Targets

Let the function g(l) represent the mapping function performed by the non-max
operation, and let Br be the R-pixel neighborhood. Thus,
⎧1
g (l ) = ⎨
⎩0

if xl = X l ≡ local maximum in Br
elsewhere

33
If f ( x | H 0 ) is the probability density function (PDF) under a null hypothesis,
then the probability density function used to model the background clutter statistics after
non-max suppression is given by [Ramachandran, 2004]:

f

NM

( x | g (l ) = 1, H 0 ) =

f ( x | H 0 ).e − N (1− F0 ( x ))
∞

∫ f ( x | H 0 ).e

_

− N (1− F0 ( x ))

(4.10)

dx

0

where N = θA is the expected (average) number of independent targets present in the
neighborhood Br , A is the area of the neighborhood Br , θ is the density of targets, and
F0 ( x ) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for f ( x | H 0 ) defined as,
x

_

_

_

F0 ( x ) = f ( x < x | H 0 ) = ∫ f ( x | H 0 )d x
0

Similarly, the probability density function used to model the mine target statistics
after non-max suppression is given by:

f

NM

( x | g (l ) = 1, H 1 ) =

f ( x | H 1 ).e − N (1− F0 ( x ))
∞

∫ f ( x | H 1 ).e

_

− N (1− F0 ( x ))

(4.11)

dx

0

where f ( x | H1 ) is the PDF under non null hypothesis.
Figure 4.4 shows the post non-max F distribution for various values of DOFN,
DOFD and N. As seen from the Figure 4.4, the distribution can take different shapes
depending on the values of DOFN and DOFD. Also, a larger value of N has the effect of
pushing the distribution towards larger values.
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Figure 4.4. Post Non-max PDF for an F Distribution with Various DOFN, DOFD, and N
Figure 4.5 shows a simulated PDF of the background and mine RX statistics for different
GSNR values after non-max suppression. As shown in the PDF, the detected number of
mines and detected anomalies are different for a given threshold. The PDF for
background RX values is drawn using Equation (4.10) and corresponding mine RX
values is drawn using Equation (4.11). The background and mine RX values are assumed
to be modeled as central F and noncentral F distribution, respectively. GSNR is
responsible for the statistical difference in the background RX (blue) and mine RX (red,
magenta and black) values, which is evident from the Figure 4.5.

4.3. PARAMETER ESTIMATION FOR RX DETECTIONS

Modeling of detection statistics is very useful because it provides valuable
information about the spatial correlation and non-homogeneity in the data. In order to
compare the performance of the RX anomaly detector for various terrains (sparsely
vegetated, densely vegetated, and/or dirt) and for different times of day (morning time,
afternoon time), it is very important to model the RX statistics using probabilistic models.
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RX value distribution of BKG and mines with different GSNR ( v1 = 3, v2 = 15, N = 70)
1.4
PDF for BKG RX vals post non-max
PDF for post non-max Mine RX vals ( GSNR = 2)
1.2
PDF for post non-max Mine RX vals ( GSNR = 4)
PDF for post non-max Mine RX vals ( GSNR = 16)
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Figure 4.5. PDF for a Post Non-Max Background Anomaly and Mine Anomaly Statistic
Value for Different GSNR Values

Previously, RX detection statistics have been successfully modeled using Beta
and Gamma distributions [Ganju, 2006; Webb, 2000; Copsey and Webb, 2001; Huiyan et
al., 2005]. In this section, the RX detection statistics will be modeled with a central F
distribution. The model estimation for the central F distribution is done using the EM
(Expectation Maximization) technique. Various statistical tests are applied to check the
goodness of fit of the modeled distribution with the actual data.
As explained in Section 4.1, the background RX statistics can be modeled by an F
distribution i.e.,
f (r : v1 , v2 ) =

r

v1
−1
2

v1 + v2
⎛v v ⎞
B⎜ 1 , 2 ⎟(1 + r ) 2
⎝2 2⎠

,

0 < x; v1 , v2 > 0
−

(4.12)

where v1 = J (number of spectral bands) and v2 = N C − J (number of pixels in clutter
template – number of spectral bands).
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Once the non-max suppression is performed, the post non-max RX statistics
becomes

f

NM

( r ; v1 , v 2 , N ) =

f ( r )e − N (1− F ( r ))
∞

∫ f ( r )e

− N (1− F ( r ))

,

(4.13)

dr

0

where F (r ) is the CDF of

f (r ) and N is the number of pixels in the local

neighborhood.
The EM algorithm is used to estimate the three parameters ( v1 , v2 , and N ) for the
post non-max central F distribution. Initial parameters that are used to start the EM
algorithm are very important and must be carefully chosen. Method of moments is
currently used to derive the initial parameters. If there are ‘p’ parameters to estimate, then
the first ‘p’ sample moments are equated to the actual moments of the distribution, given
that the actual moments are functions of the parameters of interest. Other details and
actual derivation for the initial parameters is discussed in Appendix C.
Estimation is carried out in two steps. The first step deals with the formulation of
an update equation for the central F distribution and the second step explains the use of
that update equation in estimating the parameters. Appendix B explains the EM algorithm
with its mathematical formulation and update equation for estimating the parameters for
RX modeling. Once the estimation is completed, various statistical tests are used to
measure the goodness of fit of the estimated parameters. These tests are described in
detail in Appendix D. The confidence level for the current results is taken to be 0.97. If
the chi square test statistics for a particular segment is less than the threshold, then the
segment is said to pass the test; otherwise the segment is said to fail the test. Here passing
the test implies that a reasonable model is obtained for the RX statistics for the given
segment. Thus depending on the confidence level, for the present case it is expected that
97% (because the confidence level is set to 0.97) of the segments for a given dataset will
pass the test and 3% will fail. If the percentage of failure is much higher than 3%, then
the modeling is bad; otherwise it is good.
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4.4. MODELING RESULTS

As mentioned before, in the past RX statistics have been modeled using Beta and
Gamma parameters. However in all previous work, frame-wise modeling has been used.
For the present case, an attempt has been made at segment wise modeling of the RX
statistics with a central F distribution. Estimation using Beta and Gamma distributions is
still possible but has not been implemented here.
After the non-max operation there are about 350 samples in each frame. With 21
frames per segment, there are approximately 7000 samples per segment. However, all
these samples are not used for modeling, instead, all the samples within 20 pixels of the
four edges of the frames are ignored so as to remove the bias caused by corresponding
edge pixels. This will reduce the total number of samples used for estimation.
The modeling is done for eight different types of datasets depending on the time
of day (morning background segments, afternoon background segments) and background
type (sparse vegetation background segments, dense vegetation background segments).
Morning segments are chosen between 8:00 am and 9:00 am, and afternoon segments are
chosen between 2:00 pm and 3:00 pm. For comparison between the background and
minefield segments, both background only and minefield segments are used for the
modeling.
For the background segments, all 21 frames (corresponding to seven swath and
three steps) are used for the modeling. However, only clean frames (without any fiducial
or manmade artifact) are used for modeling in case of the minefield segments. The
minefield segments are visually inspected to ignore any frame with fiducials and other
artifacts for the modeling purposes. Approximately 50 segments (equivalent to 1050
frames) are being used to generate the modeling results for all eight cases. Three different
target radiuses (rT ) of zero, one, and two are used for comparison.
Modeling is done for both single band and multiband data. An individual MSI
band 4 (NIR) is used to represent the single band data, and RGB colored band as well as
all four MSI bands are used for the multiband modeling. Table 4.1 shows the number of
segments and the exact number of frames corresponding to each dataset used for the
modeling. Thus, a total of 24 sets (eight datasets and three target radii for each dataset)
are being modeled and the fit is checked for the central F distribution.
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Table 4.1. Data Type with Number of Segments and Frames Used for Modeling

Morning Background
Segments
Morning Minefield
Segments
Afternoon Background
Segments
Afternoon Minefield
Segments
Sparse Vegetation
Background Segments
Sparse Vegetation
Minefield Segments
Dense Vegetation
Background Segments
Dense Vegetation
Minefield Segments

Number of Segments Used

Total Number of
frames used

40

40x21 = 840

45

687

40

40x21 = 840

47

736

80

80x21 = 1680

50

790

59

59x21 = 1239

68

886

Figure 4.6 shows a representative segment from sparse vegetation background.
The corresponding distribution fit for inverse CDF, and PDF is shown in Figure 4.7, for
RGB colored registered segment and target radius, rT = 2 . The sample values for the F
distribution are plotted on the ‘x’ axis, and corresponding CDF and PDF values are
plotted on the ‘y’ axis. First subplot shows the inverse CDF for the actual RX values
(blue) and the estimated values (broken red) and corresponding PDF is shown in the
second subplot. Third subplot shows the chi square bin error values. Estimated and initial
parameters for the EM algorithm are shown in the title of the second subplot of Figure
4.7. The initial ‘v1’ and ‘v2’ are derived using the method of moments as discussed in
Appendix C. An initial value of N is chosen to be 100. The pass or fail value (one or
zero, respectively) is also shown in the title of the third subplot of Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.8 shows a representative segment for a dense vegetation minefield
segment and Figure 4.9 shows corresponding distribution fit for inverse CDF, and PDF
for the actual and estimated samples along with the chi square bin error. The RGB
colored segment with rT = 2 is used for the distribution fit in this case also.
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Figure 4.6. Sparse Vegetation Background Segment

Figure 4.7. Distribution Fit for a Sparse Vegetation Background Segment

Tables 4.2 - 4.9 show the pass percentages for sparse vegetation background
segments, dense vegetation background segments, sparse vegetation minefield segments,
dense vegetation minefield segments, morning background segments, afternoon
background segments, morning minefield segments, and afternoon minefield segments,
respectively.
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The frames with fiducials are ignored through visual inspection of the frames for
the modeling purposes in the case of minefield segments to prevent any biasing caused
due to the fiducials.

Figure 4.8. Dense Vegetation Background Segment

Figure 4.9. Distribution Fit for Dense Vegetation Background Segment
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Table 4.2. Pass Percentages for Sparse Vegetation Background Segments
Sparse Vegetation Background Segments
Pass Percentages (%) for 97% confidence level, RX
Band
Target Radius 0 Target Radius 1 Target Radius 2
83.75
85.00
90.00
NIR
90.00
88.75
96.25
RGB Colored
81.00
95.00
97.50
All 4 MSI Bands

Table 4.3. Pass Percentages for Dense Vegetation Background Segments
Dense Vegetation Background Segments
Pass Percentages (%) for 97% confidence level, RX
Band
Target Radius 0 Target Radius 1 Target Radius 2
66.10
83.05
92.98
NIR
81.36
100.00
96.61
RGB Colored
81.03
87.70
98.30
All 4 MSI Bands

Table 4.4. Pass Percentages for Sparse Vegetation Minefield Segments
Sparse Vegetation Minefield Segments
Pass Percentages (%) for 97% confidence level, RX
Band
Target Radius 0 Target Radius 1 Target Radius 2
80.00
96.00
98.00
NIR
92.00
98.00
100.00
RGB Colored
90.00
94.00
98.00
All 4 MSI Bands

Table 4.5. Pass Percentages for Dense Vegetation Minefield Segments
Dense Vegetation Minefield Segments
Pass Percentages (%) for 97% confidence level, RX
Band
Target Radius 0 Target Radius 1 Target Radius 2
91.10
94.11
95.59
NIR
92.60
98.00
98.53
RGB Colored
100.00
97.00
97.02
All 4 MSI Bands
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Table 4.6. Pass Percentages for Morning Time Background Segments
Morning Time Background Segments
Pass Percentages (%) for 97% confidence level, RX
Band
Target Radius 0 Target Radius 1 Target Radius 2
65.00
77.50
90.00
NIR
75.00
95.00
97.50
RGB Colored
70.00
92.50
97.44
All 4 MSI Bands

Table 4.7. Pass Percentages for Afternoon Time Background Segments
Afternoon Time Background Segments
Pass Percentages (%) for 97% confidence level, RX
Band
Target Radius 0 Target Radius 1 Target Radius 2
72.50
85.00
95.00
NIR
75.00
95.00
97.50
RGB Colored
72.50
87.50
90.00
All 4 MSI Bands

Table 4.8. Pass Percentages for Morning Time Minefield Segments
Morning Time Minefield Segments
Pass Percentages (%) for 97% confidence level, RX
Band
Target Radius 0 Target Radius 1 Target Radius 2
75.56
100.00
100.00
NIR
82.22
97.78
97.78
RGB Colored
75.56
95.46
95.56
All 4 MSI Bands

Table 4.9. Pass Percentages for Afternoon Time Minefield Segments
Afternoon Time Minefield Segments
Pass Percentages (%) for 97% confidence level, RX
Band
Target Radius 0 Target Radius 1 Target Radius 2
72.34
95.75
97.83
NIR
87.23
97.87
97.87
RGB Colored
81.82
97.67
97.78
All 4 MSI Bands

As shown from Tables 4.2 - 4.9, the pass percentages improve with an increase in
the target radius. Moreover, as can be recalled from Section 4.3, at least 97% of the
segments should pass the chi square test to expect good modeling. Modeling seems to be
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poor for target radius of zero for most of the datasets. Reason for this behavior could be
high propensity of single pixel outliers in the image data. However, in most of the
practical applications, a target radius of 0 is not used so it can be ignored. However, as
the target radius increases, the percentage of the segments passing the chi square test
improves with some exceptions. For target radii of one and two, the pass percentages for
most of the datasets is near 97% and hence modeling can be considered good. This is also
expected because with higher target radius and hence lower effective resolution, the
image is effectively independent Gaussian.
Table 4.10 shows the distribution of segments among different datasets in
accordance with the confidence level. The total number of segments for each case of
different target radii among all the datasets is also mentioned in brackets. As noted
earlier, the confidence level is set to 0.97 and hence the segments are characterized
accordingly into four major categories:
Category 1 (threshold < 0.95): This category represents those segments that easily
passed the chi square test;
Category 2 (0.95 < threshold < 0.97): This category represents those segments that
barely passed the chi square test;
Category 3 (0.97 < threshold < 0.99): This category represents those segments that
barely failed the chi square test and;
Category 4 (threshold > 0.99): This category represents those segments that easily failed
the chi square test.
Category 4 consists mainly of those segments that are highly non-homogeneous.
Examples of these segments are shown in Figures 4.10 and 4.14, which represent the
non-homogeneity of the background.
Also for a small target radius, the tail of the distribution is heavy compared with a
larger target radius especially for the cases when most of the frames are dirt frames. This
is demonstrated, in Figure 4.10 which displays the dirt only frame. Figure 4.11 shows
both the actual as well as estimated PDF for the same FoR (NIR band only) with target
radii of 0 and 2. It can also be seen that as the target radius increases, the heaviness of the
tail decreases. However, for both the target radii, this segment passes the chi square test.

Table 4.10. Distribution of the Segments Modeled by Central F According to the Confidence Level
NIR Band
Dataset
Name

Dense
Veg. Bkg.
(59)
Dense
Veg. MF.
(68)
Sparse
Veg. Bkg.
(80)
Sparse
Veg. MF.
(50)
Morning
Time Bkg.
(40)
Morning
Time MF.
(45)
Afternoon
Time Bkg.
(40)

All 4 MSI Bands

Target
Radius = 0

Target
Radius = 1

Target
Radius = 2

Target
Radius = 0

Target
Radius = 1

Target
Radius = 2

Target
Radius = 0

Target
Radius = 1

Target
Radius = 2

< 0.95
0.95 to 0.97
0.97 to 0.99
> 0.99
< 0.95
0.95 to 0.97
0.97 to 0.99
> 0.99
< 0.95
0.95 to 0.97
0.97 to 0.99
> 0.99
< 0.95
0.95 to 0.97
0.97 to 0.99
> 0.99
< 0.95
0.95 to 0.97
0.97 to 0.99
> 0.99
< 0.95
0.95 to 0.97
0.97 to 0.99
> 0.99
< 0.95
0.95 to 0.97
0.97 to 0.99
> 0.99
< 0.95
0.95 to 0.97
0.97 to 0.99
> 0.99

37(59)
2
5
15
59(68)
3
2
4
64(80)
3
3
10
39(50)
1
5
5
19(40)
7
4
10
32(45)
2
4
7
27(40)
2
2
9
31(47)
2
4
10

48(59)
1
3
7
63(68)
1
1
3
64(80)
4
4
8
47(50)
1
1
1
31(40)
0
2
7
40(45)
5
0
0
34(40)
2
3
1
44(47)
1
0
2

52(57)
1
1
3
61(68)
4
1
2
71(80)
1
2
6
48(50)
1
0
1
34(40)
2
2
2
45(45)
0
0
0
36(40)
2
0
2
45(46)
0
0
1

47(59)
1
4
7
63(68)
0
4
1
69(80)
3
6
2
44(50)
2
3
1
31(40)
1
2
6
33(45)
4
2
6
28(40)
2
2
8
41(47)
0
2
4

56(59)
3
0
0
66(68)
1
1
0
68(80)
3
4
5
48(50)
1
0
1
36(40)
2
2
0
44(45)
0
0
1
36(40)
2
1
1
45(47)
1
1
0

55(59)
2
1
1
67(68)
0
1
0
75(80)
2
2
1
47(50)
3
0
0
39(40)
0
0
1
43(45)
1
1
0
39(40)
0
0
1
46(47)
0
1
0

46(58)
1
3
8
64(65)
1
0
0
59(80)
7
3
11
43(50)
2
1
4
24(40)
4
5
7
32(45)
2
3
8
29(40)
0
7
4
35(44)
1
1
7

48(57)
2
3
4
64(67)
1
1
1
72(80)
4
3
1
46(50)
1
2
1
37(40)
0
0
3
42(45)
1
0
2
31(40)
4
0
5
40(43)
2
0
1

58(59)
0
1
0
64(67)
1
1
1
76(80)
2
2
0
49(50)
0
0
1
38(39)
0
0
1
42(44)
0
1
1
34(40)
2
1
3
40(45)
4
0
1
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Afternoon
Time MF.
(47)

RGB Band

Threshold
Range

45

Figure 4.10. Sparse Vegetation Background Segment Predominantly Dirt

Figure 4.11. Actual and Estimated PDF for the NIR Band for Target Radii Zero and Two

Another interesting case is for the segment, which consists of various
backgrounds. For these mixtures of backgrounds, the EM algorithm fails to provide an
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accurate fit for the F distribution in accordance with the chi square test. An example for
this mixture of backgrounds is shown in the Figures 4.12 and 4.14. Figure 4.12 shows the
sparse vegetation segment with two different backgrounds. As shown from the segment,
some of the frames (Frames 13 – 21) represent a bright path (encircled in broken cyan) in
contrast to other non-bright frames (Frames 1 – 12). For this bright background, the EM
algorithm fails to find an accurate fit. However, for the rest of the frames (non-bright),
the distribution passes the chi square test. This is common behavior for these types of
background mixtures in which a whole segment is punished due to a non-homogeneous
background. Figure 4.13 shows the actual and estimated PDF and inverse CDF for bright
and non bright background. Figure 4.13(a) shows the actual and estimated PDF, and
Figure 4.13(b) shows the corresponding inverse CDF.

Figure 4.12. Segment Showing the Non-Homogeneous Dirt Background

It is worthwhile to note that EM modeling fails for the bright area, whereas it
passes for the rest of the segment. This is also visible from Figure 4.13 (b) in which the
actual inverse CDF (blue) and estimated inverse CDF (broken red) are quite off, which
results in failure. Also, the actual PDF for the bright area (solid blue) is noisier than the
actual PDF for the rest of the segment (broken green).
The presence of different and non-homogeneous backgrounds is one of the main
reasons for the failure in distribution fit. In this case, the background is either dirt or
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dense vegetation. If the segment is bifurcated on the basis of the background, i.e., if the
frames for the dirt and vegetation from the same segment are separated and then passed
separately for the modeling then it is evident that for the vegetative frames, the fit passes
the chi square test but fails for the dirt frames. Also, the tail for the dirt RX samples is
heavier than for the vegetative RX samples. A segment with two different backgrounds
(dirt and dense vegetation) is shown in Figure 4.14. Figure 4.15 shows the actual and
estimated PDF and inverse CDF for two backgrounds. Figure 4.15(a) shows the actual
and estimated PDF, and Figure 4.15(b) shows the corresponding inverse CDF.

(a) Actual and Estimated PDF

(b) Actual and Estimated Inverse CDF

Figure 4.13. Actual and Estimated PDF and Inverse CDF for Bright and Non-Bright
Background

As evident from Figure 4.15, for both backgrounds the sample RX values are very
different. For vegetation, the actual and estimated PDF are very much on top of each
other and hence pass the chi square test; however, for a dirt background, the RX values
are quite different and noisier. Also, in contrast to the vegetation frames, the dirt PDF
shows a heavy tail. Moreover, for the dirt, the actual and inverse PDF does not have a
good fit, which causes the dirt background RX values to fail the chi square test. The
difference between the two backgrounds is also visible in the inverse CDFs.
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Figure 4.14. Segment Showing Different (Dirt and Vegetation) Background

(a) Actual and Estimated PDF

(b) Actual and Estimated Inverse CDF

Figure 4.15. Actual and Estimated PDF and Inverse CDF for Dirt and Dense Vegetation
Background

4.5. OTHER ANOMALY DETECTION TECHNIQUES

The RX anomaly detector is one of the most popular techniques used for anomaly
detection. Some derivatives of the RX detector such as the normalized RX detector and
modified RX detector are also available [Chang and Chiang, 2002]. Number of other
anomaly detection algorithms have been proposed and used depending on the situation
and other factors. Some of these are unmixing component analysis [Yanfeng et al., 2006],
kernel principal component analysis [Gu et al., 2006], cluster-based anomaly detection
[Carlotto, 2005], signal subspace processing [Ranney, 2006], support vector data
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description [Banerjee et al., 2006], and anomaly detection based on multi resolution
features [Shadhan and Cohen, 2006].
False alarm mitigation (FAM) techniques are other general techniques that can be
used for anomaly detection. In general, FAM aims to reduce false alarms based on the
shape, photometric, polarity, spectral, and other properties of the mine targets to reject
likely false alarms. FAM techniques are dependent on a number of factors such as the
time of day, size and nature of the mine target, nature of the terrain, and nature of the
local background of the target. Moreover, FAM techniques exploit the characteristics of
likely mine signatures to reduce false alarms. Thus, FAM serve the dual purpose of
providing a measure of mine level detection performance as well as other features that
can be used to understand the nature of mine targets and false alarms [Menon et al.,
2004]. Circularity, radial symmetry, and gray scale moments are some of the false alarm
techniques that can be used as false alarm mitigation techniques. Detailed description of
these techniques can be found in [Menon et al., 2004].
Spectral vegetation indices can also be used to detect the presence of live green
vegetation and hence for false alarm mitigation. These indices are generated by
combining data from multiple spectral bands into a single value. More about these indices
is discussed in Appendix A.
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5.

SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION

This section discusses the spatial distribution of the targets obtained after the
anomaly detection. The spatial characteristics (physical locations) of these RX detections
can be studied and a spatial distribution can be modeled to fit the spatial location of
potential mine detections. Once the modeling for the spatial distribution is successful, the
model can be incorporated into simulation.

5.1. SPATIAL POINT PROCESSES

A collection of points each representing the location of an event in space can be
termed the spatial point process [Møller and Waagepetersen, 2006]. Mathematically, the
spatial point process is defined in the following manner [Cressie, 1991].
Let s ∈ R d be a generic data location in a d-dimensional Euclidean space, and
suppose the potential datum Z(s) at spatial location s is a random variable. Now let s vary
over index set D ⊂ R d , then the generated multivariate random field or random process
{Z(s) : s ∈ D}

(5.1)

is termed the random point process. Realization of such a process is called the spatial
point pattern [Møller and Waagepetersen, 2006], z of n points such that,
z = {z1, z 2 ,....., zn } , n ≥ 0 points contained in D

(5.2)

For the current discussion, the point processes are limited to 2D space domains
2

(R ). If the datum Z(s) represent only the location of point, it is called ‘simple’ point
process and if it contains some other markings like color, it is called ‘marked’ point
process. Important inferences about the spatial occurrences of events can be drawn from
the simple point process Z(s), where each point in such a random process represents the
location of some event. A large variety of events are possible, however, for the purpose
of the current discussion, the event is the occurrence of landmines or a false alarm.
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Spatial point patterns play a vital role in a wide variety of scientific and
engineering problems such as ecology, telecommunication, forestry, biostatistics,
geology, and economics. These patterns have also found applications in fields as diverse
as archeology, cosmology, and seismology. However, the application of spatial point
processes in the field of minefield detection is different from many other applications in a
way that for minefield detection, the spatial locations are a mixture of different processes
(the presence of a minefield and presence of false alarm/clutter). Also the exact identity
of the process associated with each event is unknown. In some cases it’s advantageous to
model such process using the framework of marked point process [Trang et al., 2007].
The current discussion is however limited to simple point processes.
Spatial patterns can be broadly classified as three distinct spatial distributions:
random, aggregated, and regular [Kummamuru, 2002; Reich, 2007] as described next.
5.1.1. Random Point Process. A point pattern is said to be random if the

presence and absence of any other location does not affect the relative location of any
point. In other words, each point’s location is independent of the location of any other
point. Checking the spatial randomness of the spatial point process is often the first step
in the analysis of spatial point processes. Reliable approach should be used to quantify
the randomness because for some observers, random processes can also appear to be
clustered. Scale is very important and should be clearly indicated because purely random
processes may appear clustered at a larger scale.
5.1.2. Aggregated Point Process. This is the most common type of point

processes in real world. As the name indicates, in the aggregated point process, the points
occur in lumps of different densities. In this case, the location of any point is not
independent of the location of other points but instead the occurrence of one point
actually favors the occurrence of other points in its neighborhood resulting in the cluster
formation.
5.1.3. Regular Point Process. Point processes in which the points are evenly

distributed over a given area approximately forming vertices of regular shapes such as
lines, rectangles, squares and triangles are called regular point patterns. In case of regular
point process, occurrence of one point disfavors the occurrence of another point in its
neighborhood. Both aggregation and regular point processes are the extreme cases for
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random point processes. An example resulting in a regular point process is shown by
walnut trees [Reich, 2007]. The roots and leaves of a walnut tree produce toxic
substances that inhibit the growth of other trees within the immediate vicinity resulting in
a regular or uniform spatial pattern. In case of minefield, patterned minefield form an
approximate regular point process.
5.2. COMPLETE SPATIAL RANDOMNESS

Complete Spatial Randomness (CSR) is the standard against which spatial point
patterns are often compared. The hypothesis of CSR for a spatial point pattern asserts that
[Diggle, 2003]:
1. Number of events in any planar region A follows a Poisson distribution with
mean λ | A | where |A| is the area of A and λ is the intensity that does not vary
over the region, and,
2. Events are equally likely to occur anywhere within area A and no interactions
occur between the events either repulsively (regular point process) or
attractively (aggregated point process).

This process has the property that, conditional on N ( A) , the number of events in a
bounded region A ⊂ R d , the events of the process are independently and uniformly
distributed over A, i.e., given N ( A) = n, the ordered n tuple of events ( s1 ,..., s n ) in An
satisfies the following identity [Cressie,1991]

n

Pr( s1 ∈ B1 ,..., s n ∈ Bn ) = ∏ (| Bi | / | A |),

B1 ,..., Bn ⊂ A,

(5.3)

i =1

Figure 5.1 shows the CSR process with the total area of the region under study, |A|
= 1000X1000 m2, and λ = 0.001/m2.

5.3. MEASURES OF COMPLETE SPATIAL RANDOMNESS
Various approaches have been used to quantify various types of spatial point
patterns against the CSR process. The most common methods are the quadrat method and
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distance method. The quadrat method is based on sampling of the area under
consideration using small regions called quadrats. A number of statistics have been
proposed in the literature based on these quadrat methods. The second type of measures
is based on a set of distance measurements made from an event to its kth nearest neighbor
or from a randomly selected sample point to its kth nearest neighbor.

5.3.1. Quadrat Measures. This method is one of the very first to be proposed to
measure the spatial randomness in point processes. It involves collecting counts of the
number of events in subsets of the study region A. Traditionally these subsets are
rectangular, although any shape is possible. Quadrats may be placed either randomly or
laid out contiguously in A. The number of events in each quadrat is collected, and these
numbers are tabulated as a frequency distribution and are called quadrat counts. Several
types of statistics are applied on these quadrat counts to calculate the test statistics. A
detailed description and implementation of these statistics based on quadrat measure has
been investigated in [Kummamuru, 2002] and more details can be found in [Cressie,
1991].
For a CSR process shown in Figure 5.1, square quadrat ( Ai ) of size 100x100 m2
are selected. Now, for each subset Ai (100X100m2 square) of study region A, the number
of events is collected. For the CSR process, these events should be samples from Poisson
distribution with mean λ | Ai | (= 10 in this case) where | Ai | is the area of subset Ai .
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of the number of events in each quadrat (quadrat
counts) and corresponding theoretical (Poisson) distribution with mean λ | Ai | . As shown
in Figure 5.2, the two distributions are in complete agreement.

5.3.2. Nearest Neighbor Distance Measures. In these methods, event to event or
point to event distances are computed and summarized. Distances can be calculated
between events and nearest neighboring events or between sample points and nearest
events. Sample points are placed in the study area randomly or systematically. These
distances are used as test statistics, and various statistical models are being used to
simulate the event to event nearest neighbor distances.
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Figure 5.1. Complete Spatial Random Process with Density = 0.001/m2
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Figure 5.2. Distribution of the Quadrat Counts
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For the CSR process, the distribution for event to event nearest neighbor statistics
can be derived as below [Corcoran, 2004]. Let λ be the mean number of points per unit
area and let D be the distance between an event and its nearest neighbor, and let x be the
radius of a circle around the event. The probability that the nearest neighbor of the event
lies in the circle of radius x is given by
P( D ≤ x) = 1 − P ( D > x)

(5.4)

Because the process is CSR, the probability of finding no point within radius x (>
0) is given by
P ( D > x) = e − λπx λ0 0! = e − λπx
2

2

(5.5)

Thus Equation (5.4) reduces to
FD ( x) = P ( D ≤ x) = 1 − e − λπx

2

(5.6)

where FD ( x) is the cumulative distribution function for the nearest neighbor.
Thus, the probability distribution function for the nearest neighbor can be found
by differentiating equation (5.5) with respect to x; i.e.,

f D ( x) =

2
2
d
d
FD ( x) = (1 − e −λπx ) = 2λπxe −λπx , x > 0
dx
dx

(5.7)

Equation (5.7) represents the probability density function for the nearest neighbor
distance x. The above derivation can be extended for the kth nearest neighbor also. The
PDF for the kth nearest- neighbor distance xk is given as [Cressie, 1991]
f D ( xk ) = 2(λπ ) k xk 2k −1e − λπxk

2

(k − 1)!,

where xk is the kth nearest neighbor distance form an arbitrary event.

xk > 0

(5.8)
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Figure 5.3 shows the actual PDF (blue) and theoretical (Equation (5.7)) PDF
(broken red) for first nearest neighbor distances for the CSR process shown in Figure 5.1.
As shown in Figure 5.3, there is good agreement between the actual and theoretical PDF.
For an aggregated process, the actual PDF will be shifted toward the left side because in
that case, the nearest neighbor distances will be less as compared to nearest neighbor
distances for a CSR point process whose example is shown in Figure 5.1. Also the
distribution is shifted toward the right for a regular point process.

Actual and Theoritical PDF for NN Distance for CSR process
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Figure 5.3. Actual and Theoretical PDF for the First NN Distances for CSR Process

5.4. SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF MINES AND FALSE ALARMS
This section discusses the nearest neighbor distances for the actual scattered and
patterned minefields and false alarms. Corresponding theoretical PDF for these are also
drawn and comparisons between actual and theoretical PDF are made.
Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of mines and corresponding nearest neighbor
distances PDF for the scattered minefield for probability of detection of 100% and 50%.
Figure 5.4(a) shows the distribution of mines in a typical scattered minefield scenario
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with density (0.0127mine/m2) displayed in the title. Figure 5.4(b) shows the comparison
between the actual and theoretical (based on CSR assumption) PDF for the nearest
neighbor distance (NN Distance) for the same case. Figure 5.4(c) shows the comparison
between the actual and theoretical (based on CSR assumption) PDF for the NN distance
when only 50% of mines are randomly selected. The actual and theoretical PDF shows
good agreement for both the cases, which would suggest that the above scattered
minefield can be modeled as CSR process and random detection does not affect the
spatial characteristics of nearest neighbor distances for the minefield.

(a) CSR process – Scattered Minefield

(b) Actual and Theoretical PDF for first
nearest neighbor distances

(c) Actual and Theoretical PDF for first nearest neighbor for PD = 0.5
Figure 5.4. CSR Scattered Minefield and Corresponding NN Distribution
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For patterned minefield, the nearest neighbor distance is fairly constant with small
variation due to placement which can be modeled as a Gaussian distribution. The
distribution of nearest neighbor distances (x) can be defined as:

f D ( x) =

−

1
2πσ S2

e

( x− S )2
2σ S2

(5.9)

where S is the separation between mines in a row and σ S2 is the variance in this
separation.
For the random detection of mines with probability of detection, pd, the
distribution of nearest neighbor distances can be derived as:

∞

f D ( x | pd ) = ∑ (1 − (1 − pd ) )(1 − pd )
2

k =1

2 ( k −1)

1
2πσ S2

−

e

( x − kS ) 2
2σ S2

(5.10)

Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of mines and corresponding nearest neighbor
PDF for the patterned minefield for PD of 100% and 50%. Figure 5.5(a) shows the
distribution of mines in a typical patterned minefield scenario. Figure 5.5(b) shows the
comparison between the measured PDF, theoretical PDF (based on Equation 5.10) and
one based on CSR assumption for the nearest neighbor distance (NN Distance) for the
case of 100% detection. Figure 5.5(c) shows the comparison between the measured PDF,
theoretical PDF and one based on CSR assumption for the NN distance for the
probability of mine detection of 50%.
As shown in Figures 5.5(b) and 5.5(c), the actual PDF is regular since the nearest
neighbor distances has a prominent peak at the separation distance (4m) for 100%
detection of mines. Moreover, for random detection of 50% of mines, the peaks in the
PDF are likely to occur at integer multiple of the separation between mines, which is
shown in the Figure 5.5(c).
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(a) Patterned Minefield

(b) Actual and Theoretical PDF for first
nearest neighbor distances

(c) Actual and Theoretical PDF for first nearest neighbor for PD = 0.5
Figure 5.5. Patterned Minefield and Corresponding NN Distribution

Figure 5.6 shows the location of false alarms detected by RX algorithm in one
background segment. As is evident from the figure, the false alarms are not distributed
randomly but, form clusters (enclosed in broken yellow).
Figure 5.7 shows the distribution of NN distances based on 15 background
segments. Blue curve shows the distribution of NN distances for actual false alarms and
red curve shows the distribution for Poisson CSR process with the same false alarm rate
drawn using Equation (5.7). The false alarm density is equal to 0.01 FA/ m2.
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Figure 5.6. Location of False Alarms in a Background Segment

Figure 5.7. Actual and Theoretical Distribution for NN Distances for False Alarms
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As shown from Figure 5.7, unlike the NN distances for scattered minefield, the
NN distances for the false alarm are not distributed corresponding to CSR process. The
false alarms are clustered as shown in Figure 5.6. This can also be interpreted from the
Figure 5.7, as the PDF for NN distances for actual false alarms is also biased toward left
indicating more false alarms in comparatively small vicinity, like an aggregated process.
Thus it becomes necessary to study other spatial distributions to model the spatial
locations for the false alarms. This aspect is however not be addressed in this thesis and is
left for future work.
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6.

MINEFIELD DETECTION AND ANALYTICAL MODELS

Once the mine level detection is complete, the next step is to detect the presence
of minefields using the information from the mine level results. Minefield detection is
dependent on the thresholded mine level detection statistics derived in the previous
section. The target locations identified after the non-max suppression and mine level
thresholding for each FoR are used for detecting the minefield and eventually evaluating
the minefield level confidence metric. Various minefield level detection algorithms are
applied on the anomaly detections to derive a metric that provides confidence level for
the presence or absence of minefields in that area. As discussed in Section 3, minefield
can be either scattered or patterned depending on the position of mines in the minefield
and the tactical scenarios. A number of minefield detection schemes are available in
literature to detect the presence of patterned or scattered minefields. Discussions on some
of these algorithms are presented in this section. This section also explains the analytical
and statistical models that are developed and used to estimate the performance for the
minefield detection. Separate analytical models are developed for both patterned and
scattered minefield for validation.

6.1. PATTERNED MINEFIELD
This section discusses the detection algorithm and analytical model for patterned
minefield.

6.1.1. Detection Algorithm. Pattern linear algorithm is one of the algorithm that
is used for evaluating the minefield level confidence values for the patterned minefield in
which mines are arranged in rows. This algorithm uses the Hough line detector [Carlson
et al., 1994] to detect the presence of mines in a linear fashion. The Hough line detector is
a powerful and extensive feature detection method well suited for the detection of lines in
the presence of noise. It is used to evaluate the maximum number of targets that fall on a
line. Hough transform projects each point on a higher dimension parametric space of
lines given by:

P = x cos θ + y sin θ , θ ∈ (−π / 2, π / 2), P ∈ (− L, L)

(6.1)
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where P represents the length of normal from the origin and θ is the orientation of P
with respect to the X axis. Figure 6.1 shows an example for the Hough transform. Figure
6.1(a) shows the five points in the spatial domain. Hough parameter space corresponding
to five points on the line is also shown in Figure 6.1(b).

P

θ

(a) Five data points in spatial domain and a
line through them

(b) Hough parameter space showing five
sinusoids corresponding to 5 data points

Figure 6.1. Hough Transform Pair Representing the Data Points in Spatial
Domain and Corresponding Sinusoids in the Hough Parameter Space

It can be shown that Equation. 6.1 is equivalent to
⎛
x⎞
P = x 2 + y 2 sin ⎜⎜θ + tan −1 ⎟⎟
y⎠
⎝

(6.2)

Thus, mapping in this Hough parameter space ( [ P, θ ] ) results in a sinusoid with
an amplitude and phase dependent on the spatial coordinates ( x , y ) of the point, i.e.,
each point in the ( x , y ) space corresponds to a single sinusoid in the Hough parameter
space. Therefore, the set [ P, θ ] that satisfies the above equation represents all lines that
can pass through line ' P .' These values of P and θ are then collected into a number of
bins called accumulators depending on the number of sectors in which a segment area is
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divided. The number of points in each bin represents the number of points that are
collinear on the line present at a distance of P from the origin and angle θ . The
accumulator bins can be further evaluated to identify targets on parallel lines by summing
targets along the same θ index to accumulate targets.
Another algorithm which can be used is pattern regular. This algorithm is the
same as the pattern linear with an exception that it enforces regularity between the targets
falling on a line [Lake et al., 1997; Malloy, 2003]. Thus, two detections that are too close
together or too far apart are neglected.

6.1.2. Analytical Model. Analytical model for linear pattern for patterned
minefield detection algorithm is described next which is applicable for pattern linear
detection algorithm. The analytical approach is based on the theoretical estimation of
minefield detection performance under certain assumptions. Patterned minefields have
mines arranged in some specific pattern, often linear. These can be in the form of a
number of rows with some predefined spacing between the rows and between individual
mines in each row. Let R denote the number of rows of mines in the patterned minefield
with M mines in each row. The detection of mines is assumed to be binomial so that if
p d is the probability of the detection of mines, then the probability of detection of
n mines in a row is given by

P[ n mines | M ] =

M!
n
pd (1 − pd ) M − n
n!( M − n)!

(6.3)

The false alarm detection is assumed to be Poisson with density ρ B . Thus, when
the minefield is not present, the probability of detection in an interrogation area of
size AS is given by
P[k | Background only] =

( ρ B AS ) k − ρ B AS
e
k!

(6.4)

The size of the interrogation area AS depends on the linearity of the minefield. In
a linear minefield, this area can be a thin strip. When a minefield is present, the total
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detections is given by the sum of mines and false alarms. Thus the probability of the
detection of k targets in area AS when a minefield is present is given by:

k

P[k | Minefield] = ∑ P (λ mine | M ).P( k − λ | Background only)

(6.5)

λ =0

In a FoR with area A , there are Q = round [A / AS ] independent measurements
from an interrogation area of size AS . Similarly for R rows of mines in the FoR, there are
R independent measurements for mine statistics. The final minefield confidence can be
taken as the maximum of these independent measurements in the FoR. The probability of
detection Pd (k ) and the probability of false alarm Pfa (k ) at any threshold k in this case
is given by

k
⎛
⎞
Pd (k ) = 1 − ⎜1 − ∑ P (λ | Minefield ) ⎟
⎝ λ =0
⎠

R

k
⎛
⎞
Pfa (k ) = 1 − ⎜1 − ∑ P (λ | Background only) ⎟
⎝ λ =0
⎠

(6.6)

Q

(6.7)

The false alarm rate at threshold ‘k’ can be written as

FAR (k) = Pfa (k )

10 6
FA/km2
A

(6.8)

Pd(k) and FAR(k) in Equation (6.6) and (6.7) can be used to draw the ROC curve for
analytical performance.
Figure 6.2 shows an analytical ROC curve for patterned minefield with three rows
of mines and different distance between mines. Distance of 4m, 5m and 6m is used
between mines. For a minefield FAR of 0.5 FA/km2, corresponding PD are 0.95, 0.72 and
0.57 for case of 4m, 5m, and 6m of separation, respectively. As can be seen from the
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figure, minefield performance improves as the separation between mines decreases. This
is expected since the number of mines in the minefield increases as the separation
between mines is reduced.

Figure 6.2. Analytical ROC Curve for Patterned Minefield with Different Distance
between Mines

Alternatively, R rows of detection (mines) can be scored in which case probability
of the detection of mines and of false alarms is given by
⎡ RM ⎤
n
( RM − n )
PR [n mine | Minefield] = ⎢
⎥ ( p d ) (1 − p d )
n
⎣
⎦

PR [k | Background only] =

( ρ B RAS ) k − ρ B RAS
e
k!

(6.9)

(6.10)
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The probability of detection Pd (k ) and the probability of false alarm Pfa (k ) at
any threshold k is given by

k

Pd ( k ) = ∑ PR (λ | Minefield )

(6.11)

λ =0

k
⎛
⎞
Pfa (k ) = 1 − ⎜1 − ∑ PR (λ | Background only) ⎟
⎝ λ =0
⎠

(S / R)

(6.12)

FAR(k) can be obtained as defined in Equation (6.8) and Pd (k ) and FAR(k) can be used to
draw the analytical ROC curves.
Figure 6.3 shows an analytical ROC curve for patterned minefield with different
number of rows in the minefield. Distance between the mines is kept constant and is
equal to 5m. For a minefield FAR of 0.5 FA/km2, corresponding PD of 0.35, 0.85 and
0.98 is obtained for 1, 2, and 3 rows of mine. The minefield performance improves
significantly as the number of rows is increased. This is expected since more number of
rows of mines in a minefield increases the number of mines available for minefield
detection.

6.2. SCATTERED MINEFIELD
Various minefield level detection algorithms and analytical model for scattered
minefield are discussed below.

6.2.1. Detection Algorithm. Scatter number is the basic algorithm for evaluating
the minefield confidence value for each FoR for a scattered minefield. In this algorithm,
the number of detections from the interrogation patch is taken as the confidence value for
the minefield. Thus, confidence value λ SN for a FoR is given as

λSN = N {D}

(6.13)

where N{D} represent the number of detections obtained from the FoR. The statistics are
applicable to the CFAR type of thresholding scheme for target detection.
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Figure 6.3. Analytical ROC Curve for Patterned Minefield with Different Number of
Rows of Mine

The test statistics in Equation (6.13) can be shown to be optimal when both the
mines and false alarms follow a CSR distribution and no other information is available to
differentiate mines from the false alarms [Earp, 2000b]. This detection scheme is quite
popular and used due to quick analysis of scattered minefield.
Scattered log weighted is another algorithm which is similar to the scattered
number except that the decision statistics are defined as the average of the log of the
detection statistics for all valid detection as proposed by Earp [Earp et al., 1995]. A
minefield test statistics obtained based on likelihood ratio is defined as:

Λ minefield =

1
N

N

∑ Ll ( x )
k =1

k

(6.14)

where Ll (x) is the log-likelihood ratio for the AD values of xi and N is the number of
targets in the FoR.

69
Using empirical result Earp [Earp, 1995] proposed a log function in place of
Ll (x) so that the test statistics is defined as:

Λ minefield =

1
N

N

∑ log( x )
k =1

k

(6.15)

This statistics is applicable to constant target rate (CTR) as well as to constant
false alarm rate (CFAR) type target detection. This value represents the minefield
confidence value for that segment.

6.2.2. Analytical Model. For a scattered minefield, it is assumed that the mines
are laid randomly over an area. Because the deployment of mines within the minefield is
random, a suitable model for the distribution can be assumed to be a “completely
random” Poisson point process [Earp, 2000a and 2000b]. In this case, the probability of
encountering a mine in an area is independent of the probability of encountering a mine
in any other area. The false detections are also assumed to be Poisson with a different
intensity parameter ρ B . The probability of getting k false alarm detections from the
background in an area A of the FoR can be modeled as

P[k | Background only] =

( ρ B A) k − ρ B A
e
k!

(6.16)

Let ρ T be the density of mines (in mines per unit area) in the minefield and p d
be the rate of detections. Then the probability of getting k mine detections in an area A
is given by
( p d ρ T A + ρ B A) k − pd ρT A+ ρ B A
e
P[k | MineField] =
k!

representing Poisson detection of both the mines and false alarms.

(6.17)
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The probability of detection Pd (k ) , probability of false alarm Pfa (k ) , and FAR at
any threshold k is given by
∞

Pd (k ) = ∑ P[γ | MineField] = 1 − e

− ( p d ρT A + ρ B A )

γ =k

( pd ρT A + ρ B A)γ
∑
γ!
γ =0

(6.18)

( ρ B A)γ
γ!
γ =0

(6.19)

k −1

k −1

∞

Pfa (k ) = ∑ P[γ | Background only ] = 1 − e − ρ B A ∑
γ =k

FAR (k) = Pfa (k )

10 6
FA/km2
A

(6.20)

Pd (k ) and FAR (k) can be used to draw the analytical ROC curves. Note that an
implicit assumption in the model is that the size of FoR is smaller than the minefield and
that the FoR is fully over the minefield. Figure 6.4 shows an analytical ROC curve for
scattered minefield with different mine densities.

Figure 6.4. Analytical ROC Curve for Scattered Minefield with Different Mine Density

71
Mine level PD at the FAR of 0.001 FA/m2 is 0.34. Mine density of 0.002
mines/m2, 0.004 mines/m2 and 0.006 mines/m2 are used. Minefield level PD values of
0.145, 0.567 and 0.882 are obtained corresponding to false alarm rate of 0.5 FA/km2. PD
and FAR are calculated using Equation 6.18 and 6.20, respectively. The minefield
performance improves as the mine density increases.
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7.

SIMULATION RESULTS

This section presents mine and minefield detection results for the simulated
parameters. Several variables are used for generating the simulated data, which are
tabulated in Table 7.1. Results are generated for both patterned and scattered minefields
with different parameters. Parameters whose effects are considered include signal to
clutter ratio (SCR), constant false alarm rate (CFAR), swath width, holidays, and segment
overlap. Each of these parameters is discussed in the following subsections.

Table 7.1. Simulation Parameters for Scattered and Patterned Minefield Data
No. of runs simulated
Flight Speed
Altitude
No. of rows, columns
No. of swath, steps
Swath width, FoR
length
FoR length
Bkg. Anomaly
distribution
Bkg. spatial
distribution
Mine Anomaly
distribution

Scattered
750
75
2050
512, 640
7, variable (1-5)

Patterned
750
75
2050
512, 640
7, variable (1-5)

60 – 290

60 – 290

feet

451– 455
Central F- distribution
(J = 4, Nc = 50)
Poisson with density of
0.01/m2
Non Central Fdistribution
(J = 4,
Nc = 50, SCR = 0.5)

451– 455
Central F- distribution
(J = 4, Nc = 50)

feet

knot
feet
pixel

Poisson with density of 0.01/m2
Non Central F- distribution
(J = 4, Nc = 50, SCR = 0.125)

Mine spatial
distribution

Poisson with density of
0.004/m2

Mine type
Mine size (No. of
Pixels)

SM_A (Small metal)

Linear (distance of 9 meters
between mines. Three rows with
distance of 20m between rows)
LM_A_B (Large metal Buried)

6 (13)

12 (50)

inch

CFAR with FAR of 0.001

FA/m2

Mine level algorithm
Minefield Algorithm

CFAR with FAR of
0.001
Scatter Number

Pattern Linear
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7.1. EFFECT OF SCR
The SCR for the RX detection is defined as in Equation (3.6)

2

J
μ
SCR = 2 = ∑ μi2 Jσ 2
σ
i =1

(7.1)

where μ is the mean target signature, and σ is the standard deviation of the background
area. Figure 7.1 shows the mine level and corresponding minefield level ROC curves for
different SCR values. Figure 7.1(a) shows the mine level ROC curve for a scatterable
minefield and Figure 7.1(b) shows the corresponding minefield level ROC curves for
SCR values of 0.4 (red), 0.5 (blue), and 0.6 (green) for the scatterable minefield with
three steps (swath width of 175 feet). The corresponding GSNR values are 20.8, 26 and
31.2, respectively.

(a) Mine level ROC curve

(b) Minefield level ROC curve

Figure 7.1. Mine Level ROC Curve and Corresponding Minefield Level ROC Curve for
Different SCR Values

As shown from Figure 7.1, the mine level as well as minefield level performance
increase with an increase in the SCR value. This is expected because with an increase in
the SCR values, contrast difference between the mine targets and background clutter
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increases, which facilitates the detection of mines. The same performance is expected for
the patterned minefield. The minelevel PDs for the SCR values at the FAR of
0.001FA/m2 are 0.19, 0.34, and 0.49, respectively, as indicated by the 'x' mark in Figure
7.1(a). Similarly, minefield PDs at an FAR of 0.5 FA/km2 are 0.30, 0.68, and 0.93,
respectively.

7.2. EFFECT OF CFAR VALUE
In this type of mine level thresholding, the false alarm rate per square meter ( ρ B )
is specified. At any selected value of ρ B , the expected number of false alarms in FoR is
constant. Figure 7.2 shows the effect of the CFAR value on the minefield level
performance. CFAR values of 0.00005 (red), 0.001 (blue), 0.004 (magenta), and 0.008
(black) are used with scattered minefields with three steps. As shown from Figure 7.2(b),
as the FAR value increases, the respective minefield performance decreases. This is
because the density of mines is very small as compared with the density of background
anomalies (0.004/m2 of mines in contrast with 0.01/m2 of background anomalies). As
CFAR value increases, the number of detected mines in FoR also increases due to
increase in PD. However, the increase is lower as compared to the increase in false alarm.

(a) Mine level ROC curve

(b) Minefield level ROC curve

Figure 7.2. Mine Level ROC Curve and Corresponding Minefield Level ROC Curve for
Different FAR Values for Scattarable Minefield
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7.3. EFFECT OF SWATH WIDTH
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show the simulation results for a swath width of 1 and 5
(steps) for patterned and scattered minefields, respectively. Magenta squares and red
diamonds represent the mines in respective figures. All of the segments are represented
by different color fills.

Figure 7.3 Simulated Minefield Layout for a Patterned Minefield with Swath Width of
One Step

Figure 7.5 shows the effect of the swath width on the minefield level performance
for a patterned minefield with three rows of mine and 20% side step overlap, and Figure
7.6 shows the effect on a scattered minefield. The number of steps of 1 (red), 2 (blue), 3
(green), 4 (magenta), and 5 (black) corresponding to a swath width of 63 ft, 119 ft, 175 ft,
232 ft, and 288 ft, respectively, are used for the results. The mine level FAR is chosen to
be 0.001 FA/m2 for both the scattered and patterned minefields resulting in a
corresponding PD of 0.33 for the scattered minefield and 0.51 for the patterned minefield.
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Figure 7.4. Simulated Minefield Layout for a Scattered Minefield with Swath Width of
Five Steps

(a) Simulated minefield performance

(b) Analytical minefield performance

Figure 7.5. Simulated and Analytical Minefield Level ROC Curves for the Patterned
Minefield for Different Swath Widths

As shown from Figures 7.5 and 7.6, a good agreement exists between the
simulated and analytical results. Also, for both the scattered and patterned minefields,
performance increases with an increasing swath width. This is expected as the minefield
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front is wider than the maximum swath width of 288 feet (88 meters). A bigger swath
width results in more mine targets in the FoR, which results in more reliable detections.
However, increasing the swath width beyond the size of the minefield front may actually
result in lower detections. This may happen for smaller tactical scattered minefields.

(a) Simulated minefield performance

(b) Analytical minefield performance

Figure 7.6. Mine Level ROC Curve and Corresponding Minefield Level ROC Curve for
Scattered Minefields with Different Swath Widths

7.4. EFFECT OF HOLIDAYS
Data are collected in the form of frames of images. These frames are then stitched
together to form an FoR/segment. This transformation of image frames in a single
coordinate system is called image registration and plays a significant role in the mine and
minefield level performance evaluation. However, for accurate image registration, it is
necessary for some portions of the consecutive frames to overlap in order to provide the
control points for the frame to frame registration. Sufficient overlap should be present in
both the in-flight and across-flight direction to obtain an accurate and undistorted mosaic
of frames. If the overlap among frames is insufficient, then holidays will exist between
the frames. Figures 7.7 and 7.8 show the simulation results for the side-step overlap for 20% (holiday) and 20% respectively. As seen from Figure 7.7, a negative side-step
overlap is quite visible resulting in the absence of control points in the in-flight direction.
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Figure 7.7. Simulated Minefield Layout for a Patterned Minefield with -20% (Holiday)
Side-Step Overlap

Figure 7.8. Simulated Minefield Layout for a Scattered Minefield with 20% Side-Step
Overlap

Although the presence of holidays allows for more area to be covered under each
run, the absence of control points results in poor alignment of detection and eventually in
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poor minefield performance. This is especially true for patterned minefields due to the
presence of a linear pattern. Figure 7.9 shows the effect of side-step overlap on the
minefield level performance for a patterned minefield with three rows of mines and
scattered minefields. Figure 7.10 shows the corresponding analytical results. Side-step
overlap of -20% (holiday, red), 0% (blue), and 20% (green) have been used for the
minefield level detection with no registration error. As shown from Figure 7.9 and 7.10,
as the side-step overlap decreases, the minefield performance increases. This can be
expected because with a decrease in the overlap, the effective swath width of the FoR
increases, which results in more targets to be permitted for the performance evaluation
for the given mine level FAR. With an increase in the number of allowable targets per
segment, the minefield confidence value increases for the segment, resulting in better
minefield performance.

(a) Patterned minefield level ROC curve

(b) Scattered minefield level ROC curve

Figure 7.9. Simulated Minefield Level ROC Curves for Patterned and Scattered
Minefields with Different Side-Step Overlap

Figure 7.11 shows the minefield performance when some amount of registration
error (5m) is present. In this case, the minefield performance for negative overlap case is
in fact poorer than positive overlap. This is because for the case of negative overlap
(holiday) or no overlap, the image frames are not stitched in any trustworthy fashion
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along the steps. Thus, pattern detections suffer because rows or targets that were actually
in a linear pattern do not appear to be so. This effect on scattered minefield detection is
less pronounced as the detection statistics are based on count and not their distribution.

(a) Patterned minefield level ROC curve

(b) Scattered minefield level ROC curve

Figure 7.10. Analytical Minefield Level ROC Curves for the Patterned and Scattered
Minefields for Different Side-Step Overlaps

(a) Patterned minefield level ROC curve

(b) Scattered minefield level ROC curve

Figure 7.11. Simulated Minefield ROC Curves for Patterned and Scattered Minefields for
Different Side-Step Overlaps with a Registration Error of Five Meter
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7.5. EFFECT OF SEGMENT OVERLAP
Once the inter-segment (frame to frame) registration is complete, the intrasegment registration must be done so as to reconstruct the complete run. Just like frame
to frame registration, the segment to segment registration is also dependent on the amount
of overlap available between the consecutive segments. A segment overlap of zero
implies that each FoR is disjointed from the others, and an overlap of six implies that
every new captured swath and the previous six swaths are used for minefield evaluation.
Examples for the segment overlap of two and segment overlap of four are shown
in Figures 7.12 and 7.13, respectively, for a scattered and patterned minefields,
respectively. Figure 7.14 shows the effect of segment overlap on the minefield level
performance for a patterned minefield with three rows of mine and scattered minefield,
respectively. Segment overlaps of zero (red) and six (blue) segments have been used for
the minefield level ROC curve.
As shown in Figure 7.14, the minefield performance improves slightly for
overlapping FoRs. This is because with the no overlap case, a minefield may lie partially
in each of two consecutive FoRs, which implies poor detection in both FoRs, and hence,
poor performance.

Figure 7.12. Simulated Minefield Layout for a Scattered Minefield with a Segment
Overlap of Two Segments
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Figure 7.13. Simulated Minefield Layout for a Patterned Minefield with a Segment
Overlap of Four Segments

(a) Patterned minefield level ROC curve

(b) Scattered minefield level ROC curve

Figure 7.14. Simulated Minefield Level ROC Curves for Patterned and Scattered
Minefields for Different Segment Overlaps
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8.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

A typical airborne minefield detection system is modeled and mine and minefield
level performance are evaluated based on simulated data under different data collection
scenarios. The simulation system created to synthesize representative data under different
scenarios of interest is discussed. The parameters that drive the system’s performance are
identified, and the simulated results are evaluated and discussed. The effects of different
thresholding schemes used for thresholding the anomaly statistics on the airborne data are
discussed. CFAR seems to be the most effective technique for threshold selection
because the threshold is selected adaptively depending on the background statistics. A
fixed threshold and constant target rate suffer with potential limitation of poor
performance due to non-homogeneity of the background. Non-homogeneity of the
background has however not been modeled in the simulation tool.
Central F distribution is successfully used for modeling the RX detection
statistics. The parameters for modified central F-distribution are obtained using EM
algorithm and the results for modeling different combinations of MSI bands, and
different target radii are shown. Eight different data sets are created depending on the
type of background, time, and for background only and background with minefield for
which the modeling performs quite well. The modeling results seem to be good especially
for target radii of 1 and 2. The results for the homogeneous or approximately
homogeneous background for a complete FoR excel, whereas for mixture of backgrounds
the modeling is generally poor indicating likely multimodal distribution. Modeling
performance and fit are shown using both PDF and inverse CDF.
Various spatial distribution techniques used for modeling the spatial locations of
the false alarms are discussed. However, a satisfactory match between the actual spatial
locations and simulated spatial locations for false alarms must be explored further
because actual spatial locations are clustered and do not follow Poisson distribution.
Analytical models for both scattered and patterned minefields are effectively derived and
implemented in the simulation system. They present a good agreement with the proposed
minefield detection algorithms. Simulation results for a range of different parameters and
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their effect are discussed in Section 7. The simulated results and analytical results are
found to be in good agreement.
The present work has laid the foundation for a simulation-based system capable of
evaluating the performance of airborne mine and minefield detection structures. In the
future, this research can be extended on a number of grounds. IR data can also be
modeled in a similar manner as the MSI data using the EM algorithm. Other anomalydetection techniques, especially FAM techniques, can also be modeled. It is also useful to
model the spatial distribution for the actual locations of the false alarms and then
incorporate those values into the simulation system. This will help to complete the
modeling tool that is capable of modeling not only anomaly values but also spatial
locations in accordance with actual data. The modeling tool can also be improved to
include multiple minefields per run. Finally, it is expected to compare the performance of
the simulated data with actual airborne collected data.

APPENDIX A.
SPECTRAL VEGETATION INDICES
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This section explains the indices that are used to classify the frames as vegetation
or non-vegetation. Several Spectral Vegetation Indices (SVIs) are available in the
literature that provides a measure of live, green vegetation in an area. These indices are
designed to enhance the vegetation signal in remotely sensed data. Most of these indices
use a combination of data from various spectral bands (red, blue, green, and near band
IR) into a single value. The idea of SVIs is based on the fact that the spectral response of
green leaves exhibits a jump in the reflectance in the near infrared NIR portion (700 –
1350 nm) due to the dominant plant pigment, chlorophyll. This response is often called
an IR rise [Emch, 2001]. Figure A.1 shows the spectral reflectance curve for dirt (brown),
rock (black), and vegetation (green). The IR rise phenomenon for the green vegetation is
quite visible from the figure. As seen in figure, the plants also exhibit pronounced
absorbance of the bluish (400 - 500 nm) and reddish (600 – 700 nm) wavelengths thus
appearing green. This absorption of red or blue bands along with IR rise can be exploited
to provide a unique index for the vegetation cover. Different SVIs are discussed in the
following Subsections.

Figure A.1. Spectral Reflectance Curves for Different Land Forms
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A.1. Simple Ratio or Ratio Vegetation Index (SR or RVI)
One of the simple SVI metric is a simple ratio between NIR and red bands. Thus,

SR or RVI = NIR/RED

(A.1)

SR values for the bare soil are generally near 1 because for the bare soil, the Red
and NIR bands have similar reflectance. For the live vegetation, the SR increases. The SR
values are unbounded and can range from 0 to infinity. Figure A.2 shows an example for
SR for a dense vegetation frame. The red and NIR bands appears in the top part of the
figure. The PDF of the SR values is also shown in Figure A.2. On the SR image, red dots
indicate the pixels having an SR value greater than 3 (representing high likelihood of
vegetation). From the figure, it can be noted that the SR is quite effective in detecting the
presence of live vegetation. The red points fall approximately on top of the vegetation
areas. The SR values are not estimated for edge pixel of 20 pixels width.

Figure A.2. Red Band, NIR Band, Simple Ratio (SR) Image and Histogram for the
Vegetation Frame. The Red Dots Indicate the Pixels Having an SR Value Greater than 3
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A.2. Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI)
NDVI is defined as:

NDVI = (NIR – RED)/ (NIR + RED)

(A.2)

As shown from Equation (A.2), the difference between the NIR and RED bands is
divided by their sum. This normalization is used to minimize the effect of variable
irradiance levels. NDVI is always bounded between -1 and 1. A higher positive value of
NDVI indicates the presence of green vegetation, whereas a value close to 0 indicates a
non-vegetation background or dead vegetation. Free-standing water (e.g., oceans, seas,
lakes, and rivers) which has low reflectance in both NIR as well as visible bands, results
in very low positive or slightly negative NDVI values, whereas clouds and snowfields
exhibit negative values for this index.
Figure A.3 shows the individual red and NIR bands along with the NDVI image
and the PDF for the NDVI values for a dirt frame. Threshold of 0.4 is used to classify the
live vegetation with other areas. As shown from Figure A.3, the histogram for the dirt
only frame is symmetric and has the peak at 0.26. Moreover, for the dirt frame, no pixel
is chosen for an NDVI value greater than 0.4. Figure A.4 shows the individual red and
NIR bands along with the NDVI image and the PDF for the NDVI values for a vegetation
frame. In this case, for a threshold of 0.4, most of the vegetative region is correctly
identified as vegetation. This indicates that NDVI can act as a good classifier to
differentiate between vegetation and non-vegetation features.
In Figure A.4, some regions with shadow are also detected as vegetation along
with the actual vegetation. This suggests that although NDVI is a good classifier for the
vegetation, some false alarms can be produced due to the presence of shadows or the
misalignment of bands.
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Figure A.3. Red Band, NIR Band, NDVI Image and Histogram for the Dirt Only Frame

Figure A.4. Red Band, NIR Band, NDVI Image and Histogram for the Vegetation Frame.
The Red Dots Indicate the Pixels Having an NDVI Value Greater than 0.4
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A.3. Normalized Difference Vegetation Index with Blue (NDVIB)
Because both the red and blue colors are absorbed by chlorophyll in live green
vegetation, the blue band can also be used to calculate the NDVI. Thus, in that case
NDVIB is defined as
NDVIB = (NIR – BLUE)/ (NIR + BLUE)

(A.3)

Figure A.5 shows an example for a blue band, NIR band, NDVIB image, and
NDVIB histogram using a blue band instead of a red band for the same frame used for
NDVI demonstration. Also, an NDVIB value of 0.6 has been used to threshold the pixels
as compared with a threshold of 0.4 used in NDVI thresholding in Figure A.4.
Comparing Figure A.4 and A.5, it can be seen that both metrics are effective for
classification of vegetation. Most importantly, in the case with blue band, the shadow is
considerably lower in the NDVIB thresholded image.

Figure A.5. Blue Band, NIR Band, NDVIB Image and Histogram for the Vegetation
Frame. The Red Dots Indicate the Pixels Having NDVIB Value Greater than 0.6.
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Figure A.6 shows the combined NDVI and NDVIB values along with red, blue,
and NIR bands. It clearly shows that in the NDVIB image, the shadows are not detected
as vegetation. The vegetation and non-vegetation areas in the frame are also
differentiated even if they are in the shadow as shown in Figure A.6. The dirt road under
the shadow (encircled in broken cyan) has lower (appear dark) NDVIB values. However,
vegetation under the shadow (encircled in broken yellow) has higher (appear bright)
NDVIB values. Thus NDVIB using the blue and NIR bands is more effective and offers
more resistance to the areas having considerable shadows as compared with NDVI using
the red and NIR bands. One of the primary reasons for this improvement could be
because the blue color is more ambient (due to sky) and hence the areas with shadows
have higher blue illumination as compared to red illumination.
As shown in Figures A.2, A.3, A.4, A.6, and A.5 the vegetation indices are easy
and effective indicators that can be used to analyze the presence of green vegetation in
the target being observed. This ability is exploited in the current discussion to classify the
image frames as being densely vegetative or sparsely vegetative. The data are needed to
be classified as dense vegetation or sparse vegetation for the modeling purposes to
analyze the effect of vegetation on the RX detection statistics and the distribution of F
distribution that is used to model them.
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Dirt road
under shadow

Vegetation in
shadow

Figure A.6. Red, Blue, and NIR Bands with NDVI and NDVIB Images. The NDVI and
NDVIB Value Histograms are Also Shown

APPENDIX B.
THE EM ALGORITHM
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The EM (Expectation–Maximization) algorithm is a general algorithm for the
maximum likelihood estimation [Trees, 2007]. It is best employed for incomplete data
sets or for data sets with missing values. The term "EM" was coined by Dempster et al.,
in a paper in 1976. In this thesis, the EM algorithm is used for parameter estimation to
model the RX test statistics in the form of a modified F distribution.
The EM algorithm estimates the parameters of the underlying distribution by
finding the maximum likelihood function f (Θ | x) for the parameter/parameters Θ given
the observed samples ' x ' in an iterative fashion starting from an initial guess. Each
iteration consists of the following two steps [Ganju, 2006; Bilmes, 1998]:
STEP 1: Expectation Step – This step finds the distribution of the complete data with
respect to the known values of the observed data and current estimate of the parameters.
The step involves the formulation of the estimation of the likelihood (or log-likelihood)
function of the complete data given the observed samples and the current fit of
parameters.
STEP 2: Maximization Step – Effectively, this step maximizes the expectation computed
in the first step; i.e., this step re-estimates the anticipated likelihood parameters under the
assumption that the distribution found in the first step is correct.
Both of the above steps are carried out iteratively until the terminating condition
is reached. The terminating condition can either be the maximum number of iterations
reached or else no significant improvement over the previous values of the likelihood. It
has already been proved in literature that with each successive iteration, the likelihood
estimate either improves or remains unchanged (attain local maximum) [McLachlan and
Krishnan, 1997].
The mathematical formulation for the EM algorithm can be explored in [Ganju,
2006; McLachlan and Krishnan, 1997].

B.1. Formulation of update the equation for the RX statistic
The above-said EM algorithm is applied on the RX statistics in the following
manner. Post non-max RX statistics can be written as
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f (r ) =

r

f1 (r ) =

where

1
f1 (r )e − N (1− F1 ( r ))
K

(B.1)
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and F1 (r ) is the CDF of f1 (r ) and K is given as:
∞
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0

Uisng the substitution, NF1 (r ) = u it can be shown that
1 − e− N
K=
,N ≠ 0
N

(B.4)

Shown above is a general result applicable to all types of distributions under nonmax suppression.

Now taking the natural logarithm of Equation (B.1)
⎛ ⎛ v v ⎞⎞ ⎛ v + v ⎞
⎛v
⎞
ln f (r ) = ⎜ 1 − 1⎟ ln r − ln⎜⎜ B⎜ 1 , 2 ⎟ ⎟⎟ − ⎜ 1 2 ⎟ ln (1 + x ) − N (1 − F1 (r )) − ln K
⎝2 ⎠
⎝ ⎝ 2 2 ⎠⎠ ⎝ 2 ⎠
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the

substituting, B ( x, y ) =

derivative

of

Equation

(B.6),

w.r.t. v1 , v2 ,

and

(B.5)

N,

and

Γ ( x )Γ ( y )
, provide the update equation for the EM algorithm for
Γ( x + y )

parameter estimation. Taking derivative w.r.t. to v1 to obtain:
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where ψ (x) is a digamma function defined as
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In the similar manner, the derivative of Equation (B.1), w.r.t. v2 , is obtained as
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Also taking the derivative wrt N can be obtained as:
1
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The derivative of the beta function with respect to v1 and v2 is defined as
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I1 and I 2 can also be simplified using the above equalities as:

1
I1 =
2

I2 =

r

1⎛ ⎛v ⎞

⎛ ⎛ r ⎞⎞

⎛ v1 + v2 ⎞ ⎞
⎟ ⎟ F1 (r ) ,
2 ⎠ ⎟⎠

∫ f1(r )⎜⎜⎝ ln⎜⎝ 1 + r ⎟⎠ ⎟⎟⎠dr − 2 ⎜⎜⎝ Ψ⎜⎝ 21 ⎟⎠ − Ψ⎜⎝
0

r
−1
1 ⎛ ⎛ v2
⎜ Ψ⎜
(
(
)
)
+
−
(
)
ln
1
f
r
r
dr
1
2 ∫0
2 ⎜⎝ ⎝ 2

⎞
⎛ v + v2
⎟ − Ψ⎜ 1
⎠
⎝ 2

⎞⎞
⎟ ⎟⎟ F1 (r ) .
⎠⎠

Equation (B.6), (B.7) and (B.8) are the required update equations corresponding to the
three parameters to be estimated, which will be used in the next step.

B.3. Parameter Estimation from update equations

Once the update equations are obtained, the information matrix is constructed.
The information matrix, ‘ I m ,’ is a square matrix whose dimensions depend on the
number of parameters to be estimated. For the current estimation problem, ‘ I m ’ is
therefore a 3x3 matrix. The information matrix for the current case is approximated as
⎡ ∂ ln[ f (r )]⎤
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Let v1k , v2k , and N k be the estimates of the parameters in the kth iteration. Then the
estimate of these parameters in the (k+1)th iteration/step is given by

k

k+1

v1

v2

k

k

∂ log[ f (r )]
∂v1
j =1
n

∑
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∂v2
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n

∑
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n

N

N

∑

(B.9)

where λ is the scaling factor.
These new estimates of the underlying parameters, ‘ v1k +1 ’, ‘ v2k +1 ,’ and ‘ N k +1 ,’ are
then used in three update equations, (B.6), (B.7) and (B.8) to yied a new information
matrix, I m . Information matrix is used in Equation (B.9) to obtain a new set of parameters
in the (k+2)th iteration. The process continues until the parameters converge to a steady
state value.

B.4. EM algorithm – Convergence Properties

Like any other non-converging optimization problem, it is possible for the
parameters to converge at a local or a saddle point rather than converging at the global
minima. This depends mostly on the type of log-likelihood function. If the log-likelihood
function is unimodal, then the convergence of the likelihood function and the parameters
is unique. However, in cases when the likelihood function is multimodal, the likelihood
function and parameters may converge to some saddle point.
In some cases, if the number of parameters to be estimated in a distribution is
large, then the parameters are observed to undergo periodic oscillations after a certain
number of iterations [McLachlan and Krishnan, 1997]. This is because as the number of
parameters increases, the likelihood surface tends to become flat and thus rather than
converging to a steady value, the parameters tend to converge to a range. Under this
phenomenon, the EM is said to converge to a circle rather than a single point.
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Another important factor deciding the convergence of the EM algorithm is the
initial starting point induced in the EM algorithm. It has been reported that if the log likelihood function has several maxima, minima, or stationary points, than the
convergence of the EM algorithm to the right point depends on the choice of the starting
point [Wu, 1983]; i.e., if the starting point is near to some saddle point or local point, then
it is highly possible that the parameters converge to that saddle point or local point. For
the present estimation problem, the initial parameters are derived using methods of
moments explained in detail in Appendix C.

APPENDIX C.
ESTIMATING INITIAL PARAMETERS FOR RX DISTRIBUTION
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Initial parameters play an important role for parameter estimation using EM
approximation. These initial parameters must be carefully chosen so that the parameters
converge to the right values. For this reason, alternatives have been searched so as to find
the best way to provide the initial parameters to the EM algorithm. One way that is
adopted here is based on Method of Moments [Pearson, 1902]. In this method, moments
for the observed data are used. If there are ‘p’ parameters to estimate, then the first ‘p’
sample moments are equated to the actual moments of the distribution, given that the
actual moments are functions of the parameters of interest.
For the central F distribution, the probability density function is defined as

f 1 ( x) =

⎛ v1
⎜⎜
⎝ v2
⎛v v
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⎝2 2
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2
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where ‘ x ’ is the random variable, ‘ v1 ’ is the numerator degrees of freedom, and ‘ v2 ’ is
the denominator degrees of freedom.

The central F distribution can be transformed into RX statistics as

f1 (r ) =

(r )

v1
−1
2

v1 + v2
⎛v v ⎞
B⎜ 1 , 2 ⎟(1 + r ) 2
⎝2 2⎠

(C.2)

v
where r = x 1 .
v2
The RX statistics, 'r' needs to be multiplied by the factor of 'k.' Then the scale
factor 'k' takes care of other non ideal factors as discussed in section 4.1.
For the present case the distribution under concern is post non-max RX detection,
not RX detection itself. However, because moments of post non-max RX detection
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statistics do not have a closed form expression, this method cannot be used to estimate
parameters in that case. But ‘ v1 ,’ ‘ v2 ,’ and ‘ k ’ can be estimated using this method and
promoted as initial parameters for the EM algorithm of parameter estimation.
The first three moments about the mean or standardized moments (mean,
variance, and skewness) for the transformed and scaled central F distribution function are
defined as follows [Johnson, 1995]:

v
Mean ( k 2 μ )
v1

2
2 v2
σ 2 ):
Variance ( k
2
v1

Skewness (S )

v
v
k 2μ= 2 ,
v1
v2 − 2

:

2
2v2 2v1 + 2v23 − 4v2 2
2 v2
2
σ =
,
k
v12
v1v23 + 20v2v1 − 8v2 2v1 − 16v1

:

S=

(2v1 + v 2 − 2) (4v 2 − 32)
(v 2 − 6) (v1 + v1v 2 − 2v1 )
2

,

v2 > 2

(C.3)

v2 > 4

(C.4)

v2 > 6

(C.5)

μ = E{r} ,

where

σ 2 = E{(r − μ ) 2 } ,
S = E{( r − μ )3} / σ 3 .

The value of ‘ v2 v1 ’ and 'k' are the scale that is required to be multiplied by the RX
detections to make it a central F distribution as explained above. As shown from
Equation (C.5), no scale is included for the skewness calculation because it is a ratio
between the two scaled quantities.
This is now just a linear equation to solve for three unknowns given three
equations in those unknowns. The solution is derived below in detail:

From C.3,

v1 = kμ (v2 − 2)

(C.6)
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Using this value of v1 and putting it in C.4 and simplifying gives:

k=

2μ

σ 2 (v2 − 4) − 2μ 2

(C.7)

Substituting Equation (C.7) into (C.6) to obtain

v1 =

2μ 2 (v2 − 2)

σ 2 (v2 − 4) − 2μ 2

(C.8)

Substituting Equations (C.7) and (C.8) into Equation (C.5) and simplifying to get

v2 =

4 μ 2 − 8σ 2 + 6Sμσ
Sμσ − 2σ 2

(C.9)

Thus from the observed samples, the mean, variance, and skewness can be easily
obtained, which can then be used in equations (C.9), (C.8), and (C.7) to derive the
estimates of ‘ v2 ’, ‘ v1 ,’ and ‘ k ,’ respectively.
The RX detections are multiplied by the scale factor ‘ k ’ before passing them into
the EM algorithm whereas scale factor of ' v2 v1 ' is dynamically applied inside the EM
algorithm. ‘ v1 ’ and ‘ v2 ’ are used as the initial parameter values for the numerator
degrees of freedom and denominator degrees of freedom, respectively. The initial
estimate of the third parameter ‘N’ is kept equal to 100 for all the cases of parameter
estimation. In the future, it may be possible to include 'k' as part of EM update equations
so that value of 'k' is estimated along with v1 , v2 , and N.

APPENDIX D.
TEST STATISTCS TO MEASURE THE GOODNESS OF FIT
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Once a set of model parameters is estimated for a given set of observations, a
metric to define the goodness of fit is of interest. Various statistical test schemes are
available to measure the goodness of fit between the observed and estimated values of the
distribution. Some commonly used goodness of fit tests are as follows:

D.1. Cramer Von – Mises (CVM) Test

The test statistics for this test is given by [Bain and Engelhardt, 1991]:

n ⎡
1
i − 0.5 ⎤
+ ∑ ⎢ F (xi:n ;θ ) −
CM =
12n i =1⎣
n ⎥⎦

2

(D.2)

where,
n = Number of observations,
F ( xi:n ;θ ) = CDF of the ordered observations, given θ,

θ = Parameter vector of the given distribution.
Here, an approximate size ‘α’ test of H0 : X ~ F is to reject H0 if CM ≥ CM1- α.

D.2. Kolmogorov – Smirnov (KS) or Kuiper Test

With same assumption as D.1., [Bain and Engelhardt, 1991], the statistics ‘D’ is
given as:
i − 1⎤
⎡i
⎤
⎡
and D = max D + , D −
D + = max i ⎢ − F ( xi:n ;θ )⎥ , D − = max i ⎢ F ( xi:n ;θ ) −
⎥
n ⎦
⎣n
⎦
⎣

(

)

V = D+ + D−

The statistic given by ‘D’ is known as the “Kolmogorov-Smirnov” or “KS”
statistic, and the statistic given by ‘V’ is known as the “Kuiper” statistic. Here also, the
‘α’ test of H0 : X ~ F is to reject H0 if KS ≥ KS1- α..

D.3. Chi – Square Test

The test statistics for the Chi Square test are given by [Bain and Engelhardt,
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1991]:

n

χ =
2

∑
i =1

⎡ (Oi - Ei )2 ⎤
⎢
⎥
Ei
⎣
⎦

(D.1)

where, χ 2 = Test Statistic,
n = Sample size,
Oi = Number of observation falling into ith cell, and
Ei = Expected number of observations to fall in the ith cell.

Here, Hypothesis H0 : X ~ F is rejected if χ 2 ≥ χ12−α , where α is the given confidence
interval.

The chi–square test is the most flexible and general test. The main limitation of
CVM and KS tests is unavailability of critical values except for a few distributions such
as exponential, weibull, and Normal required for these tests, though they can be derived
for other distributions also. For the cases in which the distribution is completely
specified, these tests perform well. However, if the parameters are estimated from the
data, then the power of these tests is reduced. This is because new critical values need to
be formulated and these must be obtained for the specific parametric form that is to be
tested. For the chi-square test, this does not create any problems because in this test the
number of degrees of freedom is adjusted in accordance with the parameters that are
estimated from the data. Because of this flexibility, this test is used for testing the
modeling results.
The degrees of freedom for the chi-square test are calculated in the following
manner. First the samples are grouped in bins such that each bin has a certain number of
samples. For the present scenario, the samples are grouped together such that each bin
has 10 samples. If the number of bins is ‘ nb ’ and ‘p’ parameters are estimated from the
data, then the degree of freedom, ‘ v ,’ is given as
v = nb − ( p + 1)
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The test statistics are calculated for a particular FoR as per Equation (D.1). Once
the degrees of freedom and test statistics are calculated, the threshold is found for the
given confidence interval. Since the test statistics follows a chi-square distribution with v
degrees of freedom, hypothesis H0 : X ~ F is rejected if χ 2 ≥ χ12−α , where α is the given
confidence interval.
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